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Genel Sonuç : Avrupa Günü’nün World Café bölümünde Öğrencilerin Vurguladıkları Öneriler.
STK’ların Türkiye AB arasındaki ilişkisinde rolünü tartışırken öğrencilerden gelen çözümler:
- Bütün STK’lar baskı grubu oluşturmalılar.
- STK’ların bağımsızlığı için bir güvence (yargı&yasa) sağlanmalı.
- STK’ların topluma daha fazla hizmet vermesi için devletten destek alması (FON)
- Okularda STK bilincinin oluşturulması için STK rapor ve aktivistlerinin ( adalet-güvenlik- özgürlük alanında) tanıtılması ve genç bireylerde STK gücünün oluşması. Bireylerin, STK’ların devlet üzerinde yapabileceği baskı kuvvetine inanmalarıyla sivil toplum daha gelişecektir.
- STK’ların özellikle barış süreci ile ilgili daha iyi medyatize edilmesi ve toplumdaki görünüş ve algının geliştirilmesi.
- STK’ların lobi oluşturması (toplumsal farkındalığı arttırma) STK’ların üniversite ve lise bazında biçimlendirmek için.
- Sosyal medya çalışmalarının yapılması
- Bilgiye erişebilirliği arttırmak.
- Uluslararası STK’lar ile işbirliği sağlayıp destek almak.
- Uluslararası STK’lardan mentörlük alınabilir.
- Uluslararası STK’ların Türkiye’de bir ayağı olmasını sağlamak
- STK’lar ülkede seçim ve referandumları denetlemeli ve şeffaflığı sağlamalıdır.
- STK’lar (ulusal ve uluslararsı) medya ve basın, ifade özgürlüğü konularında raporlar hazırlaöalı, Türkiye’de bu raporlar ışığında gerekenleri yapmalı.
- Halk ile STK’lar arasındaki örgütlenle güçlendirilmeli
- STK’lar ideolojik değil, kapsayıcı hareket ederek bağlantı kurmalı
- 23 . ve 24. fasıllar kesinlikle açılmalı ve halk bu konuda bilgilendirilmeli.
During the panel organized by the Institut du Bosphore which took place last year. I said the following. I was pessimist but tried to be optimist . I wonder what I’ll say this year on their 8.th congress.
“Etre l’avocate du diable n’est pas chose facile surtout lorsque l’on est en face d’un diable à multiples têtes, chaque tête se contredisant, cachant leurs intentions réelles, chacune semblant jouer un jeu dont on ne sait vraiment ce qui en résultera, voulant faire a sa tête alors qu’elles sont toutes reliées au même corps, à ce monde qui est a nous tous.
Les questions que je me pose et auxquels j’aimerai trouver des réponses satisfaisantes sont comme suit:
Ou en est L’UE en cette année qui s’annonce bien difficile avec une économie défaillante, des chômages accentués par une crise des refugiés, des migrants, possibilité d’un Brexit, des montées ultranationalistes, et une Commission qui se voit comme la dernière chance pour une Union unifiée.
Les membres de l’UE ne sont pas seulement sous le poids d’une crise domestique ou interne mais sous le poids d’une crise régionale et mondiale. N’arrivant pas trouver des solutions rapides a ces crises elle semble se fractionner Les tenants du retour a la nation augmentent. Je n en dirait pas plus long. Le sujet vient d’être traité.
Ce qui me fait arriver a posé ma deuxième question.
Est t’on aujourd’hui en face de ce que l’on pourrait décrire comme des contreparties logiques entre l’UE et la Turquie, ou doit on parler d’un marchandage aberrant comme le décrit avec presque les même termes le premier ministre Turc M. Davutoğlu et les membres des partis d’oppositions des pays membres de l’UE.
L’UE se voit affaiblie et divisée et croit voire en face d’elle une Turquie en position de force ce qui est loin de refléter la vérité car elle aussi est divisée, isolée de ces alliés, affaiblie par ce qui se passe a l’Est du pays, le long de ces frontières, et concernées par une économie qui ralentit et causera une hausse du sous-emploi, faillite des petites entreprises et autres…
Lorsque l’on regarde ce qui est dit du projet d’accord conclu le 7 Mars dont les détails ont du être affinés hier et aujourd’hui on voit que l’UE conçoit ce qui est fait et se fera comme des concessions, des concessions importantes alors que la Turquie voit ceci comme ce qui lui est du, comme une accélération de son processus d’adhésion a l’UE chose qui aurait du se faire automatiquement mais qui aujourd’hui se fait en échange de son engagement à bloquer l’afflux de migrants et refugiés en Europe, a reprendre ce qui sont a leurs portes. Cela aboutit à la réponse suivante: C’est un marchandage qui est entrain d’être conclut mais je garde quand même l’espoir que cela pourrait aboutir à des conclusions pouvant doper les relations entre la Turquie et l’UE dans les années à venir.
Mais quels sont les véritables pensées des deux parties concernées au sujet de l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union Européenne.
La Turquie veut elle vraiment faire part de cette Union, veut elle vraiment être “Européenne”? Lorsque on la regarde on voit plus d’une Turquie. Une qui pense qu’une démocratie musulmane basé sur le modèle de la démocratie chrétienne pourrait se faire grâce à un ancrage démocratique guidée par l’UE mais qu’elle voit aujourd’hui en dérive. Une autre qui se moyen-orientalise de plus en plus pour des raisons diverses mais qui a été aussi influencé par le refus d’une candidature basé sur des critères qui ne sont d’ailleurs pas toujours remplit complètement même par les membres de l’UE. A ce moyen-orientalisation s’ajoute une dérive autoritaire et une fermeture politique du pouvoir politique. La lutte contre le terrorisme en montée dans le pays semble avoir donné a l’Etat carte blanche pour faire ce qu’il entend. On essaye de façonner le système judiciaire afin d’assujettir le judiciaire à l’exécutif, façonner aussi le système universitaire qui est un des derniers piliers à rester un lieu de libre parole. façonner toute la Turquie lui donnant ainsi un caractère plus moyen oriental qu’il ne l’était auparavant. S’éloigne t’on d’une démocratie pluraliste, ou dérivons nous vers un régime guidé par une majorité a caractère néo féodal les jours à venir nous le dirons plus précisément
Et que fait l’UE face à ces développements dans ce pays candidat à l’UE? S’accommode-t-elle à ce développement pour que le jeu du commerce puisse continuer? N’est ce pas d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle la plupart des chapitres ouverts ne concernent en grande partie que les sujets économiques, comme le dernier chapitre ouvert, le chapitre 17 qui est consacré à la Politique Economique et Monétaire portant ainsi à 15 le nombre de chapitres ouvert sur les 35 existants. Comment expliquer pourquoi l’ouverture des chapitres 23 sur la réforme judiciaire et les droits fondamentaux et 24 sur la justice, la liberté et la sécurité n’ont pas fait partie des priorités absolues au cours des négociations menées entre la Turquie et l’UE? N’est ce pas ces mêmes deux chapitres qui ont toujours fait partie des priorités absolues au cours des négociations menées avec d’autres candidats. Pourquoi ne pas énoncer à chaque fois les principes de Copenhague pour pouvoir adhérer a l’UE, le respect de droit et des droits fondamentaux dont la liberté de réunion et d’expression? La Turquie aurait été bien différente si cette duplicité dans nos relations n’avait pas existé. Ce qui me force a posé une question à laquelle je ne répondrai pas. Je vous laisse décider. La veut on vraiment démocratique?
Il me semble que l’UE semble mener les discussions avec la Turquie non pas comme si elle était un pays candidat a l’UE mais plutôt comme un pays tiers avec lequel on mène des négociations sur des sujets économiques qui tiennent au cœur des membres. D’ailleurs lorsque l’on examine le nouveau programme de 18 mois du Conseil le nom de la Turquie n’est cité que deux fois: une fois sur la possibilité de moderniser l’Union Douanière avec la Turquie et une seconde fois sur le plan d’action sur la migration avec la Turquie. On ne parle ni de sa candidature, ni de son accession a l’UE, ni de l’ouverture de nouveaux chapitres.
Les pays membres de l’UE veulent elle vraiment une Turquie membre de l UE. Il me semble que la réponse aujourd’hui semble être tout simplement non. Cela n’est pas pour aujourd’hui ou demain. Est ce que la Turquie fait ce qu’elle a à faire pour devenir vraiment membre de l’UE? La réponse est la même : Non pas aujourd’hui, mais peut être demain.
J’aimerai terminer sur un ton plus optimiste. L’UE peut être imparfaite et on comprend très bien les critiques faites soit par la droite soit par la gauche. Mais il nous faut nous souvenir que les problèmes que nous faisons face sont plus régional, global que national. Sous les conditions actuelles, penser qu’un Etat omnipuissant pourrait trouver une solution a tout nos problèmes serait d’un irréalisme immense. Ce que vous avez de meilleur en ce moment est l’UE, gardez la intacte.
Et pour ce qui est de la Turquie, les statistiques démontrent qu’un plus grand nombre de la population Turque qu’elle soit de la droite ou non est pour une UE Notre candidature et notre adhésion a l’Union ne devrait pas etre oubliee. Faites que les nouveaux chapitres qui seront ouverts si ce deal que certains voit comme immoral est conclu soient les chapitres 23 et 24. Finissons en de cette duplicite( ikili oyundan)
Je suis consciente que ce je viens de dire n’est pas tres satisfaisant, que ce sont des wishful thinking, des exhortations à conserver de l’espoir. Ma presentation fait la part trop belle au constat negatif et pas assez au positif. In fine c’est un texte pessimiste et c’est probablement ce que ressent l’ensemble des participants que nous avons ici. Mais qu’y puis je?
Aurais je du tout changer.. Bien sur que non car c’est ma perception et elle est aussi valable que d’autres. Il n’empeche que la tonalité de ce que j ai dit est ce qu’elle est. In fine les optimistes restent confinés a une vision trop idyllique pour etre reelle. Mais le monde a besoin d’une dose d’irreel . Les montagnes ne sont jamais deplacées par le realisme et la notion du possible mais par le reve et la disruption des idées communement admises. Je n en ai pas encore entendue une ….”
Mutual distrust and interdependency, mix of conflict and cooperation are terms which have characterized Turkey’s relations with the Eu for decades.
I have now been asked to look into my crystal ball and talk about possible scenarios for Turkey in respect to its accession to the EU. Modelling scenarios can only rest on assumptions, on determining a time period for which the analysis will be valid. These scenarios need also be concomitant to those valid for the EU but one must also be reminded that scenario building in a context of flux and uncertainty is not easy.
- I. Let us start with the short run, that is for this year and the coming year. When we look at Turkey and try to describe what characterizes policies conducted three terms come to mind mind:
Reshaping: reshaping the army, the judiciary system, the bureaucracy, the media, the NGO s and now the educational system so that it will fit the identity of the new Turkey that the present government wishes to build.
Boosting : to boost economic growth the government has made appeal to financial measure as yet never used. The government has expanded a credit guarantee fund guaranteeing loans banks write to businesses. This has been followed by large private credit expansion at the same time as the government continues its huge infrastructure projects, building roads, hospitals, subways and high-speed rail. Shot of steroids will continue with the use of the wealth fund when the effects of the credit guarantee fund will have worn out.
Shifting: Shifting of axis in foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy to-day displays a fundamentally different pattern compared to previous governments. Shifting of axis is followed by what I would also call having now a loose anchor, having an erratic compass . We now drift away from the West, but at the same times messages sent are that we will not pull the plug out. We focus ourselves to our Muslim Middle Eastern neighbors but alienate ourselves from them by interfering in their domesitc affairs , talk of our belonging to the BRIC (Brazil, India, Russia, and China) countries , discuss becoming members of the Shanghai group. Drifting back and forth in our narrative is never constructive. Foreign policy in Turkey is concentrated mostly on Syria, the PKK the Ydp and ISIS and keeping our borders safe.
When we look at the present state of the EU we see that the impact of the rise of nationalism, xenophobia and racism has caused a shift in member countries public opinion towards further enlargement.The geopolitical situation in the Middle East and North Africa which is driving millions of people from their homes causing millions to be displaced, seeking asylum causes fears and ends up with talks about border closure. Turkey is being viewed as a buffer zone between a supposedly peaceful EU and a crise ridden Middle East. The EU is also faced with successive internal crises, crises which started long ago such as the rejection of the constitution, the eurozone crisis, the possibility of Grexit, the refugee crise, Brexit and rise of illiberal democratic tendencies in some member countries which causes fatigue and unwillingness in dealing with others desires
Under these circumstances that is in the short run there can only be growing enstrangement in the relations between the Eu and Turkey. Enlargement can only be shelved. Members such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy who were supporters of Turkey are now mostly concerned about recovering from the economic crise, the UK who was a fervent supporter of Turkey has during their referendum campaign done a permanent volte face, northern member states Sweeden, Finland who had also supported Turkey now view negatively the democratic backsliding of Turkey . The new alliance built with Russia causes fear in the Balkans. The result is a strengthening of the anti Turkey constituency.
In the short run I see no chance of any new dialogue between the EU and Turkey but I also think it unlikely that the EU will suspend the accession process….except if there is a reinstatement of the death penalty…
- II: What about the medium term that is from 2019 to 2023
All will depend on the form the EU will have, on how the Brexit deal will have taken shape, on the turn domestic and foreign policy in Turkey will have taken and how public opinion both in the Eu and in Turkey will view impending relations. If scepticism and opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession is still strong, there will be little chance for full accession. If in Turkey concerns over national sovereignty, fear of loss of moral values, discrimination on religious grounds and fear of territorial partition continues to be the main drivers of euroscepticism in Turkey, dialogue will be at a stand still.
If no full membership is in the agenda the alternative could be what the Germans called a priviledged parnership,or a form of associate membership In the political arena, no longer anchored to the EU, Turkey will be left to do what it wants. Depending on who would have won the elections in 2019 Turkey will have either moved to a full presidential system or a move back to a more democratic form of government which then would allow for new dialogues. Ties on the economic front will be strong , the customs union agreement will be renewed and modernized , Turkey would continue to be a strategic country for the EU for security and energy route reasons.
This medium term scenario would lead Turkey to move even more away from Europe. A divorce is more than painful whatever the settlement.
- III. As to the long term, that is 25 to 50 years from now, what can I say. Most probably most of us who are here present will not be there to see it….
The Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) organized a roundtable on Turkey-EU Relations which took place on Tuesday, October 9th at the Netherlands Consulate at the Palais de Hollande. The topics of the panel moderated by TURABDER’s president included key issues on the agenda: visa exemption for Turkish citizens, updating the Customs Union, security cooperation, and maintaining a constructive dialogue on Turkey’s reform agenda. The program was as follows and the moderator’s opening speech
The Moderator, Gül Günver Turan’s (President, Turkey-European Union Association) opening speech was as follows:
We live in difficult times and this is true not only for Turkey, but also the EU.
Fretting about fragmentation within the EU with its north moving away from its south,
Discussing how Eastern member of the EU feel left out, critizizing their being considered as second class members by core members of the EU,
The isolation felt by applicant countries who have no hope for full membership until 2025 or maybe even at a later date,
Fears about outside powers such as China, Russia trying to penetrate even divide the EU
fill the EU agenda.
We hear leaders, pro european ngos say : “We have to fight for a more united Europe. We need to fight for an open and tolerant society”,
Our next European elections in 2019 are important and we have to vote for more unity and not divisions”.
We also hear about dangers facing democracy and this not only in emerging and developing countries but in developed ones too .
We see across Europe nationalist and far right parties having made significant electoral gains, with some having taken office while others have become the major opposition.
We see centrist parties who to retain their power have seen themselves forced to adjust to the demands of extreme rightists.
Fear of globalisation, fear of dilution of national identity, having to live through financial crises and facing migrant crises have exacerbated these tendencies.
And when a tempest of this size hits Europe the deluge reaches its neighbours in greater proportions, at greater speed . A different multiplier and accelerator enters the game.
The title of to-day’s panel is Differing views on Turkey EU engagement.
Will these views be differing or complementary was my first reaction to the title? We shall probably know more after the presentations.
I was also surprised by the last part of the title “Turkey – EU engagement. Engagement? Should our relations just be labelled as an engagement. Have we accepted to be seen outside the accession process? Are we now going to talk only about Turkey- EU engagement on economic, and security issues which might bring a common understanding on only a small number of contentious issues?
Will our relations with the EU remain merely transactional? Will focusing only on narrowly defined issues such as migration and security benefit us all more or less?
All these questions to which I find no satisfactory answers and for which I yearn, long, crave to find answers.
I will not dwell any further I will leave the floor first to Mr. Ayhan zeytinoğlu, Chairman of the Economic development Foundation who will be discussing upgrading, modernizing if ever possible the customs union agreement. “Ayhan Zeytinoğlu has been the Chairman of the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) since 2015. He is also the Vice-President of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and the President of the Kocaeli Chamber of Industry since 2009. Additionally, he is a member of the General Council of the World Chambers Federation. Currently, he is writing his Ph.D. thesis on agricultural policy and Turkey’s integration to the EU at the Marmara University European Studies Institute. Ayhan Zeytinoğlu is also the General Director of Zeytinoğlu Feed & Pet Food Inc., Vice-President of the Board of Directors of Autoport Terminal Operators, and General Coordinator of Zeytinoglu Maritime.Following his undergraduate education in London, Ayhan Zeytinoğlu graduated from the University of Indiana in 1980. He holds a master’s degree in International Finance from Butler University”
Our second speaker is Dr. Zümrüt İmamoğlu who will discuss another hot and difficult topic: The potential implications of the Turkish economy’s volatility for bilateral relations with the EU . Hot because it affects the daily operations of firms and daily life of citizens, and difficult since the volatility has to be explained by the political volatility of the decision makers. “Dr. Zümrüt İmamoğlu has been serving as Chief Economist of TUSIAD since June 2015. Prior to TÜSİAD, she was a Research Associate at Bahçeşehir University Economic and Social Research Center (Betam). She has taught undergraduate and postgraduate courses at Bahçeşehir University and Kadir Has University. Her main areas of research are Macroeconomics and International Economics. Besides her academic work, she has contributed to policy notes and reports for both the private sector and public sector policy-makers. She has been a commentator at various media platforms such as BloombergHT and CNBC-e.Dr. Zümrüt İmamoğlu graduated from Istanbul Technical University in 2000 and received her master’s degree in Economics from Boğaziçi University in 2002. She completed her Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University in 2010.
Our third speaker is Dr. Metin Gürcan a researcher at the Istanbul, Policy center…….His topic is “Security Cooperation dynamics between Turkey and the EU
“Dr. Metin Gürcan, joined the Turkish Special Forces in 2000 and served in Southeast of Turkey, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, and northern Iraq as the team commander/military adviser/liaison officer until 2008. Between 2010 and 2014, Gürcan worked as an analyst officer in the Turkish General Staff. After resigning from the military in 2015. In 2014, Gürcan was a visiting research fellow at Changing Character of War (CCW) Program of Oxford University. He has been published extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals such as Turkish Studies, Small Wars Journal, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Perceptions, and is the author of two books: The Gallipoli Campaign: The Turkish Perspective and What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding Counter-insurgency in Tribalized Rural Muslim Environments. Gürcan is a columnist for Washington-based Al-Monitor and a regular contributor of Turkish T24 News Agency. Dr. Metin Gürcan graduated from the Turkish War Academy in 1998 and obtained his master’s degree in Security Studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 2010. He completed his Ph.D. at Bilkent University in 2016”Collaboration of the EU and Turkey on foreign policy issues, collaboration within Pesco and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are other dimensions of working-level engagement. If Turkey could be viewed as an instrumental partner in foreign policy it might also slow down Turkey moving away from the West.
Our last speaker is Samuel Vesterbye
“Samuel Doveri Vesterbye is the Managing Director of the European Neighborhood Council (ENC) with a specialty in Turkey and the Middle East. He oversees ENC research projects and events, including Academic Council Members and regional research coordination. He has worked with EU projects related to foreign affairs and research on Turkey since 2012 through partnerships and cooperation with the European Parliament, business associations, the European External Action Service and various international think tanks. Previously, he was a journalist in Turkey and Belgium covering Foreign Affairs, Energy and the Middle East. He graduated in Middle Eastern and Central Asian Security Studies with a focus on inter-regional trade and security from the University of St Andrews.”
Mr. Vesterbyewho will be talking about The EU Member States’ current perceptions towards Turkey’s access process, and in the absence of progress on that front, the avenues of engagement that exist between Ankara and Brussels. Quite a controversial subject especially if we consider the data of a recent Survey recently made by Optimar in 26 provinces of Turkey with 1787 participants on August30-Sep 1 which led our President to talk about a referendum on the issue of membership to the EU
What is there to be said about Turkey’s relations with the EU that has not already been said? We are in 2018, celebrating the 60th year of the start of Turkey’s relations with the EU. We have lived 60 years of ups and downs in these relations which can be classified into seven periods whose defining characteristics and themes will be briefly described below before answering the question related to where doubts and debates faced today may lead to tomorrow.
Period of Delving into Different Designs (1958-1962)
With the signing of the treaties of Rome in 1957 by the six founding members, the Common Market, that is the European Economic Communities (EEC), came into being. Turkey’s attention turned to exploring whether it should be a part of this new process and if yes, to search for ways to achieve it. During the same period, the UK was trying to put together another integration project which was less ambitious. A choice had to be made by Turkey between the two projects.
The period when the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu attended various meetings organized by the UK in Paris to form a European free trade area as an alternative to the Common Market, is not well known. Neither is the time when various meetings were held by Zorlu and his team with the members of the EEC that led to the application of Turkey to the EEC on July 31, 1959, nor are the meetings held afterwards between September 28-29 and December 2-4 1959 with the EEC delegations headed by Günter Seeliger, Director-General of the External Relations DG of the Commission of the EEC. Later on in 1963, Seeliger was one of the signatories of the Association Agreement, the famous Ankara Agreement. The minutes of the two meetings, each of which are about forty pages long are worth analyzing but should constitute the topic of another article. The military coup of 1960 stopped the process which was resumed only after a return to electoral politics.
Period of Decisions: The Ankara Agreement (1963-1979)
In 1967 the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and Euratom were fully merged and renamed as the European Community (EC). After lengthy discussions, both the EC and Turkey finally reached an agreement granting associate membership to Turkey. A three-phase model was put together. The intended goal of the preparatory first phase was to reduce the economic differences between the EC member countries and Turkey as much as possible. The next phase, a transitionary one, got a start with the signing of the Additional Protocol on January 1,1973, which envisaged how a customs union agreement could be reached later on. This implied abolishing quantitative barriers and tariffs and assuring that there would be a harmonization of Turkish legislation concerning economic matters with those of the EC. The last, the completion phase, came to life only years later in 1995 with the establishment of a customs union between the EC and Turkey.
This period was a difficult one for the world economic system, the EC, and Turkey. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 forced the EC to collaborate more intensely with one another and led to the formation of the European Monetary system in 1979. In making Europeans freer and richer, promoting economic interdependence was of utmost importance. Turkey, on the other hand, lived through political turmoil which led finally to a military coup in 1980.
For the EC, this period was the beginning of enlargement. Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EC in 1973.
Period of Degradation, Distancing, and then Democratization (1980-1986)
Due to the military coup of 1980, EU-Turkey relations deteriorated. It was only after the military leaders allowed a return to democracy and the holding of free elections that brought ANAP (Motherland Party), led by Turgut Özal, to power in 1983 that normal relations were resumed. In the meantime, the EC continued its enlargement process: Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) became members.
Period of Disequilibrating Conditions and New Drives (1987-1998)
Realizing the importance of being included in the club of now 12 members, Turkey formally applied for full membership in 1987. This period is characterized by radical events for the EU. The two Germanies were unified in 1990. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.The completion of the “single market” allowing for the free movement of goods, services, people and money and the entry in force of the Maastricht treaty in 1993 was realized. Finally, the European Community was renamed as the European Union. Austria, Finland and Sweden became new members, and the European Central Bank was formed. While integration was intensifying among the EU members, Turkey was once more going through a period of political instability with parties forming coalition governments that remained in power for only short periods. Eleven governments were formed and collapsed in eleven years, making it impossible to pursue consistent policies. The economy was in turmoil, yet Turkey was able to complete the establishment of a customs union in 1995.
Period of Durable Determination (1999 -2005)
The Amsterdam and Nice treaties that entered in force respectively in 1999 and 2003 reorganized the EU, leading to the admission of 10 new members (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) into the Union. In 1999, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey became candidate countries and in 2005, accession negotiations with Turkey started. It was therefore a shock to all when at the time when more unification was on the make that the much-awaited EU constitution was not ratified in 2005.
Turkey at that time was recovering from the important economic and financial crisis of 2001, which was overcome thanks to growth enhancing and inflation fighting reforms. This positive turn allowed for the screening process, that is compliance with the acquis communautaire comprised of 35 chapters, to commence.
Period of Dissonance, Discouragement and Deception (2006-2017)
During a time when enlargement fatigue was taking hold, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, expanding the EU to 28 members. It was also during this time that the 2008 global recession was starting to take its toll on European countries, hitting Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain particularly hard. In spite of all these upheavals, the Lisbon Treaty which, in a sense, constituted a replacement for the constitutional treaty, was ratified in 2009, bringing institutional and external policy changes to the EU’s operations. While the EU was undergoing troubled times, Turkey’s relations with the EU were also undergoing radical changes. The causes are manifold: the non-settlement of the Cyprus issues, not extending the customs union to Cyprus, the anti-Turkish accession platform led by Sarkozy and others, and delays in realizing the various legal and human rights reforms in Turkey. The attempted military coup on July 15, 2016 and what followed afterwards moved Turkey further away from the EU. Finally, EU-Turkey relations stalled completely.
Period of Doubts and New Debates (2018-…..)
Viewing Turkey’s politics and economics over time, certain traits never seem to change whichever government is in power. We have always lived through periods of contractions and expansions in our economy, usually described as a liberal economy, a somewhat free market for goods, services, and capital. Our democracy has always swung back and forth between the more authoritarian and the more democratic, leading us nowadays to be labelled with some exaggeration as an authoritarian democracy with the traits of a rogue state, a look alike of Russia and China. Democratic expansions which have been succeeded by a narrowing of our social life, our rights, our freedoms, our faith in our judicial system, have ended up having important repercussions in our relations with the EU.
What does the future hold for Turkey is a question asked by many? Will it remain a country where authoritarianism and ultra-nationalism will have become irredeemably deeply-rooted in its political arrangement? The answer is complicated by the fact that Turkey is living through an identity crisis of its own where its modernization and secularization experience is being questioned by the current administration, representing in many ways a counter-elite to those that have ruled Turkey until the turn of this century. Stemming from the same social religious roots, and social background as their conservative and religious electors, it is not clear that this new elite shares the same vision for society as their predecessors. An elitist authoritarianism is on the rise and seems so far not to be rejected by those who vote for the governing party in the highly polarized politics of the country. These new elites are able to maintain and expand their supporters and enlarge their electoral base to different segments of the society by mobilizing the support of those who were previously the “others” through nationalist rhetoric and by promising a modernized liberal economy thoroughly integrated into the global economy. In a way, the past is being reconstructed, but in a new form. The secularists wanted to change society, wanted to reform the “other,” but today it is this “other Turkey” which wishes to return the favor by doing what was done to them by those whom they consider to be “not one of them.” The “us” and the “they” confront one another with similar but more reinforced authoritarian methods which are utilized to harness all oppositions.
The next question one needs to raise is the following: In the current situation, what can we expect from Turkey’s relations with the European Union? If one reads attentively the speech French President Macron gave to the European Court of Human Rights in October 2017, we see that he speaks of a Europe which “reaches far beyond the borders of the EU”; it is a Europe “which extends to its confines, such as Turkey.[1] This cuts short all doubts about Turkey’s place in Europe. He also puts forward the following: “I am firmly convinced that the fate of Russia and Turkey will not be improved by turning their backs on Europe, since these two great nations are anchored in Europe, since their history, geography, their literature and their political consciousness have developed through close contact with Europe.” He speaks of “criticizing without engaging in a closed-door policy.” He emphasizes that Europe “should not exclude them from everything, nor, furthermore allow them to exclude themselves.” We must hold the line says he, and so must we.
This brings us to the fundamental question: Will this engagement which has lasted for 60 years be concluded with a marriage, even if a forced one? Turkey is in a new crisis with the EU and certainly a very serious one with Germany since July 15. Add to this the unexpected military operation conducted by Turkey in Northwest Syria which elicited disapproval from France and other members of the EU.
The policy of polarization conducted at the domestic and international level by the government has resulted in isolating Turkey from its former allies within the EU and outside the EU. Accession talks are frozen and will probably remain so in the coming years but the membership process will not be closed by Turkey. Playing the membership card to the Turkish public, though not of vital importance, still needs to be taken into consideration. The latest polls dating November 2017 and conducted by the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) demonstrates that 78.2 percent of the Turkish population still wishes for a continuation of the accession negotiations. Since opinion polls of Eurobarometer show low approval rates for Turkey’s candidacy, one can expect membership talks to remain frozen while official and unofficial meetings concerning subjects such as terrorism, the refugee crisis, illegal immigration, the renewal of the Custom’s Union Agreement, visa issues, and Permanent Structured Cooperation talks to continue. Security and economic issues will always play an important role in the softening of these relations. Positive externalities, spillover benefits can still occur for all.
Since Iceland decided to stop negotiations with the EU, Brexit, and the rise of populism and undemocratic strategies and policies implemented by some of the members of the EU, discussions centering on the future of democracy, and even the future of the Union, have entered the EU agenda. The political institutionalization of the EU is in question, and the identity crisis that had been perceived for some time now seems to have deepened. The question of whether the EU wishes to be multicultural or be defined by cultural and religious traditions is also being raised. A choice will have to be made. The White Paper presented by Juncker in 2017 and the program proposed by President Macron aim to construct new visions for the future of the EU. Their visions are different. Juncker seems to favor the unity of the Union, while Macron speaks of a divided EU, a different one which necessitates institutional reform as well as changes in the Treaty of Lisbon. Though Turkey is not party to these developments, it is concerned by these issues of tension which need to be resolved one way or another by the EU.
At this point in time many European leaders agree that isolating Turkey and cutting ties with it is not the solution. The EU needs to support civil society in Turkey, the business circles should continue to work together, and the member states as well as the Commission should collaborate on subjects related to security, economic, and cultural issues until hopefully Turkey’s democracy reverts to accepted norms. Avoiding clashes and looking for synergies are the critical elements of a positive approach. Conditions may change in such a way that Turkey’s joining the EU may regain currency in the future.
[1] Speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic at the European Court of Human Rights, 31 October 2017, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20171031_Macron_ENG.pdf
TURABDER Başkan Yardımcımız Doç. Dr. Zeynep Alemdar Boğaziçi Üniversitesi-TÜSİAD Dış Politika Forumu’nun “Almanya ve Fransa Seçimlerinin Ardından AB’nin Geleceğine İlişkin Olasılıklar” başlıklı toplantısına katılarak bir konuşma yaptı.
Dış Politika Forumu Direktörü Prof. Dr. Hakan Yılmaz’ın moderatörlüğündeki toplantıda Avrupa’nın ileri gelen düşünce kuruluşlarından Avrupa Dış İlişkiler Konseyi (ECFR) Berlin Ofisi Başkanı ve Kıdemli Uzmanı Josef Janning ve Institut Montaigne Avrupa Birliği Uzmanı Morgan Guérin’in yanısıra Kültür Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Özge Zihnioğlu da sunumlar yaptı.
Katılımcılar, TÜSİAD Konferans Salonu’nda Kasım 2017 Perşembe günü gerçekleşen toplantıda sivil toplum ve iş dünyasından katılımcıların sorularını da yanıtladılar.
Alemdar, Avrupa’nın içinde bulunduğu terör endişesinin, göçmen krizinin ve AB’nin kendi içinde yaşamakta olduğu yapısal sorunların, Türkiye-AB arasında gerilimli de olsa devam eden bir diplomatik ilişkiyi beraberinde getirdiğini ifade etti. 2017 Eurobarometre bulgularına göre, 2014 yılından bu yana ilk kez terörizmin ve göç sorununun Avrupa’da ekonomi ve işsizlikten daha büyük sorunlar olarak görüldüğünü belirten Doç. Dr. Alemdar, küresel ekonomide Çin’in payı büyürken, Avrupa’nın payının gittikçe daraldığını ifade etti. Bunun yanı sıra, Polonya, Macaristan, Çek Cumhuriyeti gibi ülkelerin popülist ve aşırıcı liderleriyle Avrupalılık değerlerini savunanlar açısından endişe verici olmaya başladığını kaydetti. Keza, İsveç ve Finlandiya gibi ülkelerde dahi ırkçı söylemlerin yükselişe geçtiğini belirtti. Tüm bu gelişmeler ışığında Avrupa değerlerinin tehlikede olduğunu söyleyebileceğimizi ve Brexit’in bir tür yeniden yapılanma çağrısı olarak okunabileceğini kaydeden Alemdar, Mart 2017’de açıklanan Beyaz Kitap’a yakından bakarsak Avrupa’nın geleceğine ilişkin üç senaryonun öne çıktığını belirtti.
İlk senaryonun Avrupa Birliği’nin yalnızca bir pazara dönüşmesi olarak özetlenebileceğini ifade eden TURABDER Başkan Yardımcısı Doç. Dr. Zeynep Alemdar; uluslararası konularda iş birliği ya da vatandaşlık haklarında bir düzenleme öngörmeyen bu senaryonun AB liderlerinden pek destek bulmadığını kaydetti.
Ancak yine de bu senaryonun gerçekleşmesi halinde, Türkiye’nin AB üyeleriyle yalnızca ikili ilişkiler kurabileceğini ifade eden Alemdar, bu ikili ilişkilerin de kısa süreli krizlere daha az dayanaklı olacağını ve Türkiye için AB’nin hiçbir çıpa olma ihtimalinin kalmayacağını ifade etti.
İkinci senaryonun, AB’nin daha az alanda (inovasyon, ticaret, güvenlik, göç, sınır güvenliği gibi) daha etkin çalışması olarak formüle edildiğini; ancak bu senaryonun da AB’nin mevcut parçalı yapısını göz önünde bulundurursak, öncelikleri kimin belirleyeceği sorusunu cevapsız bıraktığını belirtti.
Bu senaryoda, AB’de hangi ülkelerin güvenlik, savunma, göç gibi alanlarda karar alacağının Birliğin Türkiye ile ilişkileri açısından da belirleyeci olacağını ve Türkiye’nin özellikle NATO ile ilişkilerinin de iyi gitmediği dönemlerde bölgesel güvenlik mekanizamlarına nasıl katılacağının belirsizleşeceğini iletti.
Üçüncü senaryonun ise, istekli üyelerin bazı politika alanlarında daha ileri entegrasyona gidebileceği çok katmanlı bir model öngördüğünü belirten Alemdar, bu senaryonun da bürokratik karar alma süreçlerini karmaşıklaştırmak ve vatandaşların AB’den faydalanma düzeyini vatandaşı oldukların ülkenin insiyatifine terk etmek gibi sonuçlar yaratabileceğini kaydetti. Komisyon başkanı Juncker’in 2017 Eylül ayında yaptığı konuşmaya bakılacak olursa, hâlihazırda üzerinde durulan senaryonun bu sonuncu senaryo olduğunu belirten Alemdar, yaşanacak dönüşümde Türkiye’nin nerede duracağını bugünden düşünmemiz gerektiğini ifade etti.
Yakın gelecekte Türkiye’nin de dahil olduğu bir genişleme sinyali göremesek de; göç, sınır güvenliği ve terörle mücadele alanlarının hem Türkiye’nin hem de AB’nin birbirlerine ihtiyaç duyduğu alanlar olarak var olmaya devam edeceğini kaydeden Alemdar, Türkiye’nin mülteci anlaşması, terör karşıtı koalisyon ve Gümrük Birliği anlaşmasının yenilenmesi başlıklarına odaklanması gerektiğini ifade etti. Uluslararası sistemin arafta olduğu, bir yanda akıl almaz teknolojik gelişmelere tanık olurken, diğer yanda popülist indirgemeciliğin seçmene bu denli cazip geldiği bir ortamda, Türkiye’deki AB dostlarının da beraber daha sıkı çalışması gerektiğini ifade etti. 
The response to the Great Recession from European social democratic/centre-left parties, with some notable exceptions like Portugal’s, was largely to implement the austerity policies of the right: they bailed out the banks and the bondholders, and they tightened fiscal policies and supported loose monetary ones. The economic and political consequences of these policies have been disastrous, particularly for Southern Europe: they led to brutal recessions that have left many of our countries in shambles, with deepening inequalities, increasing political instability, and a pervasive sense of fear and loss of hope about the future. These have led to the electoral defeats of centre-left parties and fueled the rise of populism all over Europe.
The biggest mistake, of course, was the acceptance and implementation of austerity, which turned social democratic governments into reactionaries. Centre-left politicians, convinced that elections were won from the centre, obsessed with a mission to prove that they could also be fiscally responsible, incapable of joining forces at EU level to counter Germany’s dogmatism, and complacent because they felt that leftist voters had no alternatives, jumped eagerly onto the austerity bandwagon, in some cases even doubling down to prove their bona fides to the markets, with all the consequences our countries will suffer from for years to come.
The problem, however, is that despite this debacle the left does not seem to be undergoing a process of renewal. We are missing a formulation of new policies and alternatives that challenge the dominant neoliberal paradigm.
Decline And Fall
There are structural reasons for the decline of social-democratic/centre-left parties and unions: workforces are less unionized, and traditional class identities and party systems have eroded. Furthermore, most of the current problems preceded the crisis. Indeed, the relative stagnation of real incomes among the working and middle classes; falling living standards; the decline of social mobility; the increase in employment insecurity driven by technological changes and the liberalization of trade and financial markets; and the cultural and social upheaval wrought by immigration, these all started decades before the Great Recession. The centre-left, however, minimized these problems and failed to come up with policies to address them effectively.
If centre-left parties want to arrest their decline and confront effectively the rise of populism, they need to find a way forward that addresses the concerns of a broad middle-class: acknowledging their justified fears and anxieties and making them the starting point of their policy initiatives rather than an afterthought. They either return to their Keynesian roots and offer hope and solutions to the young and their own traditional voters, or the populist parties will and they will be left out on the margins.
Rather than blindly supporting fiscal austerity and free trade agreements, which have hurt their core traditional constituencies, progressive governments need to find the right mix of monetary and fiscal policies, support public sector investment, and lower taxes to the middle class to encourage greater consumption. They also need to reform their tax and welfare systems to encourage a fairer distribution of wealth and reduce inequality, as well as invest in infrastructure and in their communities; implement industrial policies that help diversify our economies as well as apply labor standards that protect our workers, even if we need to change our trade rules; and enforce financial regulations that prevent the damage caused by short-term capital flows. Finally, they need to rethink how we educate and train our workforce to meet the demands of the future.
And they need to accept that many of the solutions need to be implemented at the European level. The constraints imposed by EU rules are central to understand the predicament of centre-left parties because Eurozone members must abide by a plethora of strict fiscal rules that constrain national policies and have forced centre-left parties to worship at the altar of budgetary restraint and competitiveness to satisfy their Eurozone masters (as well as financial markets), often at the expense of social policies and their citizens’. Right now, for any country to escape the fiscal straitjacket of the Growth & Stability Pact, the only real option is to leave the euro. That is the solution offered by extremist parties. Rather, what we need is more fiscal flexibility and a Eurozone-wide investment plan funded by Eurobonds. While this is now opposed by Germany, centre-left parties need to find a way to come together and counter this rigid stance.
Moreover, centre-left leaders need to acknowledge that while globalization may be blamed, it cannot be wished away. They need to accept that the world is different: the combination of factors that enabled global growth and expanded globalization have weakened, trust in governments and institutions has largely evaporated, the national social compacts that supported welfare states and trade openness have eroded, and consensus around immigration and free trade has come undone. Indeed, the recent crisis has brought to the fore the imbalances between globalization and the power of national governments, and it has showcased the strong links between money and politics along with the negative effects of trade agreements that have been written largely for the benefits of corporations. That needs to change. The benefits of globalization must be fairly distributed, corporations and the wealthy need to pay their fair share of taxes, and policies need to be developed to cushion the social upheaval.
The centre-left has not died but it needs to build a new coalition to reinvent and re-energize itself. Populists feed on pessimism. In order to deal with the splintering of its traditional support base and confront the rise of populism, the centre-left should come up with an optimistic narrative that focuses on opportunities to address the fears of the day, while offering real solutions to citizens’ problems. This should start with a rejection of austerity in favor of investment economics, as well as growing European economic cooperation and solidarity. There is no easy blueprint to rebuild trust but it is urgent that this process starts. The future of our liberal democracies is at stake.
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2017/04/future-social-democracy-europe/
2017 is the year of choices: after important elections in several Member States, the European integration process can be reinvigorated in the autumn with a renewed sense of purpose, or it can continue to decline in a cacophony of national voices deaf to each other. Some of the key upcoming reflections on the future of the EU27 following the Commission’s White Paper will concern the updating of the ‘European social model’ and the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
If political agreement on the European Pillar of Social Rights and on a Eurozone fiscal capacity is found, it will likely be based on the concept of upward economic and social convergence. So it was, at least, in the case of recently adopted reports in the European Parliament and in the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015. Making the EU and EMU a win-win project for all Member States and social groups again is an ambition that still garners political majority. However, the solidity of any agreed European solutions depends on the solidity of the underlying mutual understanding: what does ‘convergence’ really mean?
Many of the disagreements and dilemmas are elucidated in an excellent recent paper by Fritz Scharpf. He argues that the EMU either has to continue with ‘forced structural convergence’ towards the Northern model (export-driven economies with a preference to send savings overseas rather than spend them domestically), or the EMU should pursue a controlled split: the ‘core’ would keep the euro and a hard-currency-based economic model, while ‘peripheral’ countries could switch to national currencies, floating but connected with the EMU through pre-agreed exchange rates and bandwidths, using the ERM II. The second-tier members of this ‘European Currency Community’ would still enjoy the ECB’s protection against speculative attacks and they would perhaps also receive financial support from the ‘core’ in order to manage the transition.
A Eurozone For Hard-Currency Economies Only?
In Scharpf’s view, not even a common budgetary capacity could make the EMU as its stands more sustainable: a ‘transfer union’ in the current EMU set-up is a no-go for the Northerners because any fiscal transfers from the high-surplus ‘core’ would strengthen domestic demand in the periphery. This would, in their view, counteract the periphery’s structural transformation towards greater cost-competitiveness and export orientation. As Scharpf points out, fiscal transfers to the second-tier members would only become justified from the ‘core’s’ viewpoint once the ‘peripheral’ countries descend into the second league, i.e. trade in the ERM II at more sustainable exchange rates, reflecting their weaker competitiveness.
Scharpf shows convincingly that the ‘prize’ of forced convergence towards the Northern model may not be ‘worth winning’. Not only is it objectively difficult for economies to switch from a growth model based mainly on domestic demand to a model more focused on exports, but even if all 19 members of the Eurozone managed to become more like Germany and kept running high current account surpluses, the gains in terms of growth and employment would at some point be offset by the inevitable appreciation of the euro. This argument, repeatedly also made by Timbeau et al., means, moreover, that assets being acquired across the world today for European savings are likely to lose value in euro terms when the euro appreciates, as can be expected once Eurozone inflation recovers and the ECB begins to tighten monetary policy.
A hard-currency-based model with suppressed domestic demand would also eliminate one of the important advantages of EMU as formulated e.g. in the ‘One Market, One Money’ report: a large internal market that is resilient to global downturns. The euro was not set up as a tool to achieve savings surpluses but as a tool for balanced economic growth aiming at full employment and social progress. In today’s global context it would hardly be seen as a friendly gesture if the Eurozone continued to squeeze domestic demand and increased its current account surplus even further above 3% GDP.
A European Convergence Model
The key question for 2017 is, therefore, whether Europeans can identify a ‘European’ model of convergence that could guide further EMU deepening, replacing Scharpf’s binary choice between separation and forced convergence towards the ‘Northern’ model. Can Europe articulate an economic policy based on a healthy and sustainable balance between external competitiveness and domestic demand? If, as Regan says, the real source of the euro crisis was in ‘joining together two distinct macroeconomic growth regimes’, can Europe agree on a meaningful synthesis of the two?
The European Commission is increasingly treating the Eurozone as a single macroeconomic entity and it ventured to propose for it in 2017 an expansionary aggregate fiscal stance of approximately 0.5% GDP that would in its view best reconcile the objectives of public debt sustainability and economic growth, notably given that monetary policy is already very accommodative and large investment gaps persist. The Commission and the EP have also become less timidin recommending that Germany should boost domestic investment in order to reduce its high external surplus and contribute to a more symmetric re-balancingwithin the Eurozone. However, Scharpf considers that expecting from Germany a major internal revaluation and reorientation towards domestic demand is not realistic. Indeed, the German finance ministry and its followers have been countering the Commission’s attempts at implementing a macroeconomic policy for the Eurozone as a whole and have insisted that the solution consists mainly in further effort by the ‘weaker’ countries to boost cost-competitiveness and national ‘adjustment capacity’ through internal devaluation. For the moment at least it seems that the German government is more willing to contemplate downsizing the Eurozone than further strengthening domestic demand and/or establishing a Eurozone fiscal capacity to support other countries.
A ‘Convergence Code’ for the Eurozone has been touted in several EP reports but no agreement exists yet on what its key criteria or indicators should be. The Europe 2020 targets and the ‘Integrated Guidelines’ are officially the basis for policy coordination in a process known as the European Semester, but this is limited to recommendations and monitoring. Neither the EU nor the Eurozone have sufficient instruments to ensure that the jointly agreed targets are actually met. EU Structural and Investment Funds amount to 0.4% of EU GDP, not enough to achieve balanced growth across the EU or even to lift 20 million people out of poverty. The system of European economic governance can restrain fiscal policies and wage developments, but is not effective in preventing countries from being too frugal. Without stronger common instruments, the EMU will continue to operate on a predominantly ‘Northern’ model that favours cost-competitiveness.
In an effort to ‘rebalance’ the European economic system, the Party of European Socialists has formulated a programme of progressive reforms and investmentsfor convergence and proposed a Eurozone fiscal capacity that would support such reforms and investments. This could be done through instruments inside the EU budget and/or by extending the role of the European Stability Mechanism and adapting the character of its programmes.
In this approach, upward convergence could be achieved through investments in higher productivity as well as higher employment, addressing especially investment gaps in ‘peripheral’ countries. Technology and infrastructure investments (e.g. for the energy transition) would be needed as well as ‘social investments’ in skills, education, support for school-to-work transitions or quality childcare. Competitiveness, output and income levels would rise through productivity improvements rather than labour cost-cutting. The notion of a decade-long process of upward convergence based on socially balanced reforms and investments is also taken up in the recommendations of the high-level working group under the ‘Repair and Prepare’ project of the Jacques Delors Institute.
On this basis, peripheral countries could upgrade their economies without suppressing domestic demand. The Eurozone fiscal capacity would come on top of existing EU Structural and Investment Funds that promote convergence and cohesion in the Single Market. At the same time, ‘core’ countries would be expected to continue gradual internal revaluation through higher wages and domestic investments, favouring greater job creation in sectors linked to domestic demand.
Such a ‘European convergence model’ would require all Member States to adapt their current economic models. An investment strategy, an industrial policy and possibly re-thinking of some national debt brakes would logically follow. Instead of cost-competitiveness and external surpluses, greater focus would be placed on productivity, employment and domestic investment. Relevant social standards could also be agreed in this context, such as the Youth Guarantee, a Skills Guarantee, basic characteristics of social safety nets and coordination of national wage floors. Now that the acute phase of the Eurozone crisis is over and the global context also pushes the EU27 to stay together, a balanced European model of convergence should be agreed. The results of upcoming national elections will obviously matter a lot, which is why the European Council will probably draw first conclusions on the Commission’s White Paper only in December.
A Currency That Is Neither Hard, Nor Weak
Those favouring a smaller and more compact Eurozone are arguably right that this should have been the decision in the 1990s, but that is no longer the question we face. The short-run disruption caused by the splitting of the Eurozone would likely be severe for both the ‘periphery’ and the ‘core’. For the longer term, partial flexibility of exchange rates under ERM II could go some way to freeing up national monetary policies in the service of output stabilization. However, a ‘weak currency model’ for Southern European countries would also have important disadvantages. This was, after all, the situation in which these countries were prior to the euro and when unemployment rates were in many cases very high.
Disadvantages of national currencies in terms of transaction costs and exchange rate risk and the impact on investment are well-known. Moreover, even if periodic competitive devaluations can be resisted, a weak currency may invite external investors to set up shop, produce cheaply, and then transfer profits abroad. Recent experience of countries like the Czech Republic suggests that keeping a relatively weak national currency may constrain the catching-up process: instead of re-investing, capital owners prefer to channel a considerable part of their earnings away and convert them into stronger currency holdings (especially if they can also avoid taxes that way). Continued upward convergence requires gradual currency appreciation and/or counteracting of private sector outflows through external support, such as from European Structural and Investment Funds.
In conclusion, splitting the Eurozone into two leagues need not be the only way forward, provided that agreement can be found on a coherent ‘European model of convergence’. This model should be based on a balance between external competitiveness and domestic demand, and a mix of reforms and investments for sustainable development. Only based on this understanding can a meaningful ‘convergence code’ and its indicators be developed. Adequate European financial instruments will then be needed to support a transformation towards the ‘European convergence model’ over time. Achieving agreement on these points during 2017 would be a great signal that Member States are once more willing to make a ‘choice for Europe’ and finally determined to put the EMU on a more sustainable footing.
Safeguarding peace and stability in the Western Balkans demands the EU’s full involvement
Conflicts are flaring up in the Western Balkans, jeopardising not only regional relations but also the European integration process of many of the (potential) candidate countries. These recent developments have exposed the fragility of democratic systems in the region. In light of the influence of third parties in the region due to a drop in EU presence, and the erupting historic tensions, there is a profound danger to peace and stability in the Western Balkans.
The perspective of European Union membership has for almost two decades offered an incentive for reform in the Western Balkans. But enlargement has dramatically shifted down the list of priorities as the EU is facing a myriad of internal and external challenges, not in the least a changing geopolitical environment and the need to reinvent itself as the EU27.
The deteriorating EU-Russia relationship is also reflected in dynamics in the Western Balkans. All in all, a positive narrative and enlargement momentum are currently missing in spite of some developments and achievements in the individual countries’ accession processes.
Present all over Europe, including in the Western Balkans, the European Movement works actively for an integrated and democratic Europe. We remind that the examples from the last enlargements confirm that the accession process had a huge impact on the reform processes and economic development in the respective countries. In the Western Balkan countries, the perspective of accession to the EU has been the key leverage for fragile democracies to continue the reform process, democratisation and establishment of the rule of law. This also means that the Western Balkan countries should become EU members after they fulfill the enlargement criteria on individual and merit based principles. Essential in their transformation is the acceptance of European values – peace, democracy, pluralism, rule of law, human rights – unfortunately often challenged in practice in the EU itself, which undermines its credibility.
The European Movement shares the growing concern about the fragile situation in the Western Balkans. There is a real danger that the region is further drawn into geopolitical power-play and that the exploitation of historical dividing lines ignites new conflicts. There is also a genuine responsibility for the regions’ leaders to maintain peace and stability as a precondition for democratic development and prosperity. These are not just empty words but, as the Balkans know only too well, the only alternative that is beneficial for all citizens in this part of Europe. Regional meetings and dialogue on contested issues must be more frequent, constructive and inclusive.
The EU needs to give its full attention to the developments in the region, support democratic and economic development and urge for caution and restraint on the side of its Western Balkan partners. At the same time the EU needs to include enlargement in all strategic reflections of the EU’s common future as well as to reassess and improve available instruments, including support for CSO capacity building, for a successful enlargement process based on the principles described above. The EU should engage individually with each country to see what the EU can offer in terms of conciliation and support, using a more credible enlargement perspective as leverage where possible.
It is crucial that both top-down and bottom-up actors work towards ensuring a safe democratic space where citizens can discuss freely, democratic decisions can be made by functioning institutions, and be implemented by a responsible government.
European Movement International
European Movement FYR of Macedonia
Preparatory Committee of the European Movement Albania
Preparatory Committee of the European Movement Bosnia Herzegovina
Safeguarding peace and stability in the Western Balkans demands the EU’s full involvement
28.3.2017
