European Union Economic and Monetary Union and Single Market

What is there to be said about Turkey’s relations with the EU that has not already been said? We are in 2018, celebrating the 60th year of the start of Turkey’s relations with the EU. We have lived 60 years of ups and downs in these relations which can be classified into seven periods whose defining characteristics and themes will be briefly described below before answering the question related to where doubts and debates faced today may lead to tomorrow.

Period of Delving into Different Designs (1958-1962)

With the signing of the treaties of Rome in 1957 by the six founding members, the Common Market, that is the European Economic Communities (EEC), came into being. Turkey’s attention turned to exploring whether it should be a part of this new process and if yes, to search for ways to achieve it. During the same period, the UK was trying to put together another integration project which was less ambitious. A choice had to be made by Turkey between the two projects.

The period when the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu attended various  meetings organized by the UK in Paris to form a European free trade area as an alternative to the Common Market, is not well known. Neither is the time when various meetings were held by Zorlu and his team with the members of the EEC that led to the application of Turkey to the EEC on  July 31, 1959, nor are the meetings held afterwards between September 28-29 and December 2-4 1959 with the EEC delegations headed by Günter Seeliger, Director-General of the External Relations DG of the Commission of the EEC. Later on in 1963, Seeliger was one of the signatories of the Association Agreement, the famous Ankara Agreement. The minutes of the two meetings, each of which are about forty pages long are worth analyzing but should constitute the topic of another article. The military coup of 1960 stopped the process which was resumed only after a return to electoral politics.

Period of Decisions:  The Ankara Agreement (1963-1979)

In 1967 the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and Euratom were fully merged and renamed as the European Community (EC). After lengthy discussions, both the EC and Turkey finally reached an agreement granting associate membership to Turkey. A three-phase model was put together. The intended goal of the preparatory first phase was to reduce the economic differences between the EC member countries and Turkey as much as possible. The next phase, a transitionary one, got a start with the signing of the Additional Protocol on January 1,1973, which envisaged how a customs union agreement could be reached later on. This implied abolishing quantitative barriers and tariffs and assuring that there would be a harmonization of Turkish legislation concerning economic matters with those of the EC. The last, the completion phase, came to life only years later in 1995 with the establishment of a customs union between the EC and Turkey.

This period was a difficult one for the world economic system, the EC, and Turkey. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 forced the EC to collaborate more intensely with one another and led to the formation of the European Monetary system in 1979. In making Europeans freer and richer, promoting economic interdependence was of utmost importance. Turkey, on the other hand, lived through political turmoil which led finally to a military coup in 1980.

For the EC, this period was the beginning of enlargement. Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EC in 1973.

Period of Degradation, Distancing, and then Democratization (1980-1986)

Due to the military coup of 1980, EU-Turkey relations deteriorated. It was only after the military leaders allowed a return to democracy and the holding of free elections that brought ANAP (Motherland Party), led by Turgut Özal, to power in 1983 that normal relations were resumed. In the meantime, the EC continued its enlargement process: Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) became members.

Period of Disequilibrating Conditions and New Drives (1987-1998)

Realizing the importance of being included in the club of now 12 members, Turkey formally applied for full membership in 1987. This period is characterized by radical events for the EU.  The two Germanies were unified in 1990. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.The completion of the “single market” allowing for the free movement of goods, services, people and money and the entry in force of the Maastricht treaty in 1993 was realized. Finally, the European Community was renamed as the European Union. Austria, Finland and Sweden became new members, and the European Central Bank was formed. While integration was intensifying among the EU members, Turkey was once more going through a period of political instability with parties forming coalition governments that remained in power for only short periods. Eleven governments were formed and collapsed in eleven years, making it impossible to pursue consistent policies. The economy was in turmoil, yet Turkey was able to complete the establishment of a customs union in 1995.

Period of Durable Determination (1999 -2005)

The Amsterdam and Nice treaties that entered in force respectively in 1999 and 2003 reorganized the EU, leading to the admission of 10 new members (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) into the Union. In 1999, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey became candidate countries and in 2005, accession negotiations with Turkey started. It was therefore a shock to all when at the time when more unification was on the make that the much-awaited EU constitution was not ratified in 2005.

Turkey at that time was recovering from the important economic and financial crisis of 2001, which was overcome thanks to growth enhancing and inflation fighting reforms. This positive turn allowed for the screening process, that is compliance with the acquis communautaire comprised of 35 chapters, to commence.

Period of Dissonance, Discouragement and Deception (2006-2017)

During a time when enlargement fatigue was taking hold, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, expanding the EU to 28 members. It was also during this time that the 2008 global recession was starting to take its toll on European countries, hitting Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain particularly hard. In spite of all these upheavals, the Lisbon Treaty which, in a sense, constituted a replacement for the constitutional treaty, was ratified in 2009, bringing institutional and external policy changes to the EU’s operations. While the EU was undergoing troubled times, Turkey’s relations with the EU were also undergoing radical changes. The causes are manifold: the non-settlement of the Cyprus issues, not extending the customs union to Cyprus, the anti-Turkish accession platform led by Sarkozy and others, and delays in realizing the various legal and human rights reforms in Turkey. The attempted military coup on July 15, 2016 and what followed afterwards moved Turkey further away from the EU. Finally, EU-Turkey relations stalled completely.

Period of Doubts and New Debates (2018-…..)

Viewing Turkey’s politics and economics over time, certain traits never seem to change whichever government is in power. We have always lived through periods of contractions and expansions in our economy, usually described as a liberal economy, a somewhat free market for goods, services, and capital. Our democracy has always swung back and forth between the more authoritarian and the more democratic, leading us nowadays to be labelled with some exaggeration as an authoritarian democracy with the traits of a rogue state, a look alike of Russia and China. Democratic expansions which have been succeeded by a narrowing of our social life, our rights, our freedoms, our faith in our judicial system, have ended up having important repercussions in our relations with the EU.

What does the future hold for Turkey is a question asked by many? Will it remain a country where authoritarianism and ultra-nationalism will have become irredeemably deeply-rooted in its political arrangement? The answer is complicated by the fact that Turkey is living through an identity crisis of its own where its modernization and secularization experience is being questioned by the current administration, representing in many ways a counter-elite to those that have ruled Turkey until the turn of this century. Stemming from the same social religious roots, and social background as their conservative and religious electors, it is not clear that this new elite shares the same vision for society as their predecessors. An elitist authoritarianism is on the rise and seems so far not to be rejected by those who vote for the governing party in the highly polarized politics of the country.  These new elites are able to maintain and expand their supporters and enlarge their electoral base to different segments of the society by mobilizing the support of those who were previously the “others” through nationalist rhetoric and by promising a modernized liberal economy thoroughly integrated into the global economy. In a way, the past is being reconstructed, but in a new form. The secularists wanted to change society, wanted to reform the “other,” but today it is this “other Turkey” which wishes to return the favor by doing what was done to them by those whom they consider to be “not one of them.” The “us” and the “they” confront one another with similar but more reinforced authoritarian methods which are utilized to harness all oppositions.

The next question one needs to raise is the following: In the current situation, what can we expect from Turkey’s relations with the European Union? If one reads attentively the speech French President Macron gave to the European Court of Human Rights in October 2017, we see that he speaks of a Europe which “reaches far beyond the borders of the EU”; it is a Europe “which extends to its confines, such as Turkey.[1] This cuts short all doubts about Turkey’s place in Europe. He also puts forward the following: “I am firmly convinced that the fate of Russia and Turkey will not be improved by turning their backs on Europe, since these two great nations are anchored in Europe, since their history, geography, their literature and their political consciousness have developed through close contact with Europe.” He speaks of “criticizing without engaging in a closed-door policy.” He emphasizes that Europe “should not exclude them from everything, nor, furthermore allow them to exclude themselves.” We must hold the line says he, and so must we.

This brings us to the fundamental question: Will this engagement which has lasted for 60 years be concluded with a marriage, even if a forced one? Turkey is in a new crisis with the EU and certainly a very serious one with Germany since July 15. Add to this the unexpected military operation conducted by Turkey in Northwest Syria which elicited disapproval from France and other members of the EU.

The policy of polarization conducted at the domestic and international level by the government has resulted in isolating Turkey from its former allies within the EU and outside the EU. Accession talks are frozen and will probably remain so in the coming years but the membership process will not be closed by Turkey.  Playing the membership card to the Turkish public, though not of vital importance, still needs to be taken into consideration. The latest polls dating November 2017 and conducted by the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) demonstrates that 78.2 percent of the Turkish population still wishes for a continuation of the accession negotiations.  Since opinion polls of Eurobarometer show low approval rates for Turkey’s candidacy, one can expect membership talks to remain frozen while official and unofficial meetings concerning subjects such as terrorism, the refugee crisis, illegal immigration, the renewal of the Custom’s Union Agreement, visa issues, and Permanent Structured Cooperation talks to continue. Security and economic issues will always play an important role in the softening of these relations. Positive externalities, spillover benefits can still occur for all.

Since Iceland decided to stop negotiations with the EU, Brexit, and the rise of populism and undemocratic strategies and policies implemented by some of the members of the EU, discussions centering on the future of democracy, and even the future of the Union, have entered the EU agenda. The political institutionalization of the EU is in question, and the identity crisis that had been perceived for some time now seems to have deepened. The question of whether the EU wishes to be multicultural or be defined by cultural and religious traditions is also being raised. A choice will have to be made. The White Paper presented by Juncker in 2017 and the program proposed by President Macron aim to construct new visions for the future of the EU. Their visions are different. Juncker seems to favor the unity of the Union, while Macron speaks of a divided EU, a different one which necessitates institutional reform as well as changes in the Treaty of Lisbon. Though Turkey is not party to these  developments, it is concerned by these issues of tension which need  to be resolved one way or another by the EU.

At this point in time many European leaders agree that isolating Turkey and cutting ties with it is not the solution. The EU needs to support civil society in Turkey, the business circles should continue to work together, and the member states as well as the Commission should collaborate on subjects related to security, economic, and cultural issues until hopefully Turkey’s democracy reverts to accepted norms. Avoiding clashes and looking for synergies are the critical elements of a positive approach. Conditions may change in such a way that Turkey’s joining the EU may regain currency in the future.

[1] Speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic at the European Court of Human Rights, 31 October 2017, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20171031_Macron_ENG.pdf

 

2017 is the year of choices: after important elections in several Member States, the European integration process can be reinvigorated in the autumn with a renewed sense of purpose, or it can continue to decline in a cacophony of national voices deaf to each other. Some of the key upcoming reflections on the future of the EU27 following the Commission’s White Paper will concern the updating of the ‘European social model’ and the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

If political agreement on the European Pillar of Social Rights and on a Eurozone fiscal capacity is found, it will likely be based on the concept of upward economic and social convergence. So it was, at least, in the case of recently adopted reports in the European Parliament and in the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015. Making the EU and EMU a win-win project for all Member States and social groups again is an ambition that still garners political majority. However, the solidity of any agreed European solutions depends on the solidity of the underlying mutual understanding: what does ‘convergence’ really mean?

Many of the disagreements and dilemmas are elucidated in an excellent recent paper by Fritz Scharpf. He argues that the EMU either has to continue with ‘forced structural convergence’ towards the Northern model (export-driven economies with a preference to send savings overseas rather than spend them domestically), or the EMU should pursue a controlled split: the ‘core’ would keep the euro and a hard-currency-based economic model, while ‘peripheral’ countries could switch to national currencies, floating but connected with the EMU through pre-agreed exchange rates and bandwidths, using the ERM II. The second-tier members of this ‘European Currency Community’ would still enjoy the ECB’s protection against speculative attacks and they would perhaps also receive financial support from the ‘core’ in order to manage the transition.

A Eurozone For Hard-Currency Economies Only?

In Scharpf’s view, not even a common budgetary capacity could make the EMU as its stands more sustainable: a ‘transfer union’ in the current EMU set-up is a no-go for the Northerners because any fiscal transfers from the high-surplus ‘core’ would strengthen domestic demand in the periphery. This would, in their view, counteract the periphery’s structural transformation towards greater cost-competitiveness and export orientation. As Scharpf points out, fiscal transfers to the second-tier members would only become justified from the ‘core’s’ viewpoint once the ‘peripheral’ countries descend into the second league, i.e. trade in the ERM II at more sustainable exchange rates, reflecting their weaker competitiveness.

Scharpf shows convincingly that the ‘prize’ of forced convergence towards the Northern model may not be ‘worth winning’. Not only is it objectively difficult for economies to switch from a growth model based mainly on domestic demand to a model more focused on exports, but even if all 19 members of the Eurozone managed to become more like Germany and kept running high current account surpluses, the gains in terms of growth and employment would at some point be offset by the inevitable appreciation of the euro. This argument, repeatedly also made by Timbeau et al., means, moreover, that assets being acquired across the world today for European savings are likely to lose value in euro terms when the euro appreciates, as can be expected once Eurozone inflation recovers and the ECB begins to tighten monetary policy.

A hard-currency-based model with suppressed domestic demand would also eliminate one of the important advantages of EMU as formulated e.g. in the ‘One Market, One Money’ report: a large internal market that is resilient to global downturns. The euro was not set up as a tool to achieve savings surpluses but as a tool for balanced economic growth aiming at full employment and social progress. In today’s global context it would hardly be seen as a friendly gesture if the Eurozone continued to squeeze domestic demand and increased its current account surplus even further above 3% GDP.

A European Convergence Model

The key question for 2017 is, therefore, whether Europeans can identify a ‘European’ model of convergence that could guide further EMU deepening, replacing Scharpf’s binary choice between separation and forced convergence towards the ‘Northern’ model. Can Europe articulate an economic policy based on a healthy and sustainable balance between external competitiveness and domestic demand? If, as Regan says, the real source of the euro crisis was in ‘joining together two distinct macroeconomic growth regimes’, can Europe agree on a meaningful synthesis of the two?

The European Commission is increasingly treating the Eurozone as a single macroeconomic entity and it ventured to propose for it in 2017 an expansionary aggregate fiscal stance of approximately 0.5% GDP that would in its view best reconcile the objectives of public debt sustainability and economic growth, notably given that monetary policy is already very accommodative and large investment gaps persist. The Commission and the EP have also become less timidin recommending that Germany should boost domestic investment in order to reduce its high external surplus and contribute to a more symmetric re-balancingwithin the Eurozone. However, Scharpf considers that expecting from Germany a major internal revaluation and reorientation towards domestic demand is not realistic. Indeed, the German finance ministry and its followers have been countering the Commission’s attempts at implementing a macroeconomic policy for the Eurozone as a whole and have insisted that the solution consists mainly in further effort by the ‘weaker’ countries to boost cost-competitiveness and national ‘adjustment capacity’ through internal devaluation. For the moment at least it seems that the German government is more willing to contemplate downsizing the Eurozone than further strengthening domestic demand and/or establishing a Eurozone fiscal capacity to support other countries.

A ‘Convergence Code’ for the Eurozone has been touted in several EP reports but no agreement exists yet on what its key criteria or indicators should be. The Europe 2020 targets and the ‘Integrated Guidelines’ are officially the basis for policy coordination in a process known as the European Semester, but this is limited to recommendations and monitoring. Neither the EU nor the Eurozone have sufficient instruments to ensure that the jointly agreed targets are actually met. EU Structural and Investment Funds amount to 0.4% of EU GDP, not enough to achieve balanced growth across the EU or even to lift 20 million people out of poverty. The system of European economic governance can restrain fiscal policies and wage developments, but is not effective in preventing countries from being too frugal. Without stronger common instruments, the EMU will continue to operate on a predominantly ‘Northern’ model that favours cost-competitiveness.

In an effort to ‘rebalance’ the European economic system, the Party of European Socialists has formulated a programme of progressive reforms and investmentsfor convergence and proposed a Eurozone fiscal capacity that would support such reforms and investments. This could be done through instruments inside the EU budget and/or by extending the role of the European Stability Mechanism and adapting the character of its programmes.

In this approach, upward convergence could be achieved through investments in higher productivity as well as higher employment, addressing especially investment gaps in ‘peripheral’ countries. Technology and infrastructure investments (e.g. for the energy transition) would be needed as well as ‘social investments’ in skills, education, support for school-to-work transitions or quality childcare. Competitiveness, output and income levels would rise through productivity improvements rather than labour cost-cutting. The notion of a decade-long process of upward convergence based on socially balanced reforms and investments is also taken up in the recommendations of the high-level working group under the ‘Repair and Prepare’ project of the Jacques Delors Institute.

On this basis, peripheral countries could upgrade their economies without suppressing domestic demand. The Eurozone fiscal capacity would come on top of existing EU Structural and Investment Funds that promote convergence and cohesion in the Single Market. At the same time, ‘core’ countries would be expected to continue gradual internal revaluation through higher wages and domestic investments, favouring greater job creation in sectors linked to domestic demand.

Such a ‘European convergence model’ would require all Member States to adapt their current economic models. An investment strategy, an industrial policy and possibly re-thinking of some national debt brakes would logically follow. Instead of cost-competitiveness and external surpluses, greater focus would be placed on productivity, employment and domestic investment. Relevant social standards could also be agreed in this context, such as the Youth Guarantee, a Skills Guarantee, basic characteristics of social safety nets and coordination of national wage floors. Now that the acute phase of the Eurozone crisis is over and the global context also pushes the EU27 to stay together, a balanced European model of convergence should be agreed. The results of upcoming national elections will obviously matter a lot, which is why the European Council will probably draw first conclusions on the Commission’s White Paper only in December.

A Currency That Is Neither Hard, Nor Weak

Those favouring a smaller and more compact Eurozone are arguably right that this should have been the decision in the 1990s, but that is no longer the question we face. The short-run disruption caused by the splitting of the Eurozone would likely be severe for both the ‘periphery’ and the ‘core’. For the longer term, partial flexibility of exchange rates under ERM II could go some way to freeing up national monetary policies in the service of output stabilization. However, a ‘weak currency model’ for Southern European countries would also have important disadvantages. This was, after all, the situation in which these countries were prior to the euro and when unemployment rates were in many cases very high.

Disadvantages of national currencies in terms of transaction costs and exchange rate risk and the impact on investment are well-known. Moreover, even if periodic competitive devaluations can be resisted, a weak currency may invite external investors to set up shop, produce cheaply, and then transfer profits abroad. Recent experience of countries like the Czech Republic suggests that keeping a relatively weak national currency may constrain the catching-up process: instead of re-investing, capital owners prefer to channel a considerable part of their earnings away and convert them into stronger currency holdings (especially if they can also avoid taxes that way). Continued upward convergence requires gradual currency appreciation and/or counteracting of private sector outflows through external support, such as from European Structural and Investment Funds.

In conclusion, splitting the Eurozone into two leagues need not be the only way forward, provided that agreement can be found on a coherent ‘European model of convergence’. This model should be based on a balance between external competitiveness and domestic demand, and a mix of reforms and investments for sustainable development. Only based on this understanding can a meaningful ‘convergence code’ and its indicators be developed. Adequate European financial instruments will then be needed to support a transformation towards the ‘European convergence model’ over time. Achieving agreement on these points during 2017 would be a great signal that Member States are once more willing to make a ‘choice for Europe’ and finally determined to put the EMU on a more sustainable footing.

 

Ligue européenne de Coopération économique

Commission économique et sociale

Milan, le 17 juin 2016

« L’avenir des échanges, des investissements et des négociations commerciales internationales»

Original : français

Recommandation adoptée par la Commission économique et sociale le 17 juin 2016

Et par le Conseil Central de la LECE le …  2016

La Commission économique et sociale (CES) de la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique (LECE), réunie à Milan, le 17 juin 2016, a débattu du thème « L’avenir des échanges, des investissements et des négociations commerciales internationales », avec plusieurs personnalités : Monsieur Luca de CARLI, Deputy Head of Unit Trade Strategy, Commission européenne ; Monsieur Thomas COTTIER, Professeur émérite de l’Université de Berne et ancien Directeur du World Trade Institute ; Monsieur Charles-Henri WEYMULLER, Chef du bureau de la politique commerciale au Trésor, Ministère français de l’Économie et des Finances ; Monsieur Guillaume DUVAL, Rédacteur en chef de la revue “Alternatives économiques”. L’Ambassadeur Gianfranco VARVESI a également donné lecture d’un message de l’ancien Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République d’Italie Enrico LETTA.

1. La Commission retire de ces débats les constatations suivantes :

1. Depuis la crise économique de 2008-2009, le rythme de croissance des échanges internationaux, naguère élevé (près de 7 % par an en moyenne entre 1995 et 2008[1]), connaît un ralentissement marqué ; ils ont même pour la première fois baissé, en valeur absolue (-3%) comme en valeur relative, en 2009. Certains pensent qu’il faut y voir une inflexion durable liée à un essoufflement du “fractionnement des chaînes de valeurs” et à de nouvelles tendances protectionnistes, voire néo-nationalistes, qui se font jour dans nombre de pays; d’autres s’attendent en revanche à ce que le rythme traditionnel de croissance des échanges, deux fois plus rapide que celle du PIB mondial (elle-même ralentie), reprenne[2]. Cependant, l’échec relatif, après douze années d’efforts, du cycle de négociations commerciales internationales dit “Doha Round“, lancé en 2001, inquiète les spécialistes, dans la mesure où des négociations régionales ou même bilatérales, ou des accords sectoriels plurilatéraux, se substituent désormais aux négociations internationales pilotées par l’OMC ; les moyens de pression des pays forts sur les plus faibles y sont bien évidemment plus grands que dans un cadre multilatérale large.
2. La négociation de grands accords trans-pacifique (TPP) et transatlantique (TTIP ou TAFTA) a été lancée pour rouvrir des perspectives de développement des échanges internationaux en y incorporant, au-delà des baisses de droits de douanes, les questions complexes mais essentielles des services, de l’accès au marché et des normes, y compris les normes sanitaires, sociales et environnementales. Cependant, les progrès attendus de ces négociations – lancées trop tardivement, selon certains – sont, selon les modèles économiques, plus faibles et plus incertains que par le passé[3]. Surtout, les opinions publiques s’inquiètent et se mobilisent, parfois à partir de préjugés et y compris dans les pays traditionnellement libre-échangistes, contre le projet TTIP/TAFTA, y voyant un risque de remise en cause de protections jugées essentielles pour leur mode de vie et leur environnement ; par exemple : la compatibilité des progrès envisagés avec les annonces faites lors de la Conférence “COP21” sur le changement climatique est fortement mise en doute, même si certains avancent que le TTIP pourrait aussi aider à résoudre certains problèmes environnementaux. La recherche d’un système satisfaisant de résolution des conflits entre investisseurs et Etats a fait l’objet d’un débat intense tant dans l’opinion publique européenne qu’au Parlement européen et a conduit la Commission européenne à proposer un nouveau système juridictionnel (Cour arbitrale). Enfin, l’opacité des modes de négociation est mise en cause; cette critique a conduit la Commission à diffuser récemment sur son site le mandat que lui ont confié les Etats membres et des informations à chaque étape de la négociation.
3. Dans ce contexte, les distorsions de concurrences, réelles ou supposées, prennent une importance majeure. Les obstacles non-tarifaires aux échanges, sujet traditionnel, sont exacerbés par la multiplication des normes et des régulations. La manipulation des taux de change par des pays cherchant à regagner de la compétitivité ou simplement à se préserver de la déflation fait crier certains à la guerre des changes. Dans ce débat, la question de la reconnaissance de la Chine comme économie de marché à part entière, prévue au sein de l’OMC à la fin de cette année, fait problème. Les entreprises d’Etat jouent en effet un rôle crucial dans une économie encore largement gouvernée par la puissance publique ; de plus, le ralentissement de la croissance en Chine conduit à l’apparition de surplus exportables qui font accuser la Chine de pratique de dumping systématique dans des secteurs comme la sidérurgie et le ciment.
4. Au-delà de ces aspects strictement économiques, les conséquences sociales de la mondialisation sont de plus en plus contestées, des deux côtés de l’Atlantique. En effet, la progression des échanges s’est accompagnée d’une progression préoccupante des inégalités et du chômage dans la plupart des pays développés, qui semble elle-même être une des causes du ralentissement de la croissance mondiale. Les niveaux de vie se sont fortement élevés pour une mince couche de la population, mais ont stagné pour la majorité dans les pays industrialisés; et les phénomènes de “working poor” et d’exclusion se sont renforcés. En outre, il semble aujourd’hui difficile, au moins dans certains pays, de résorber le chômage apparu du fait de la concurrence d’une main-d’œuvre à bas salaires et de normes sociales et environnementales défaillantes dans les pays émergents ou en développement. L’effort de formation dans nos pays ne semble pas suffisant – ou suffisamment adapté – pour y remédier et pour mieux intégrer les effets du progrès technologique.
5. Dans la théorie économique, l’accroissement des investissements directs à l’étranger (IDE) en direction des pays du Sud devrait permettre d’appuyer le développement des échanges internationaux et le rattrapage des pays en développement. En réalité on constate jusqu’à une période toute récente que la part des pays avancés (Amérique du Nord, Europe, Japon) a été largement dominante, et que ces investissements ont été moins importants pour certains pays du Sud que les flux purement financiers ou que les envois de fonds des travailleurs immigrés. Dans la toute dernière période apparaît une tendance au renversement de ces flux, les investissements se faisant de plus en plus depuis certains pays du Sud gros investisseurs, comme la Chine, vers d’autres pays du Sud (Afrique) et plus encore vers les Etats-Unis ou l’Europe. Les prises de contrôle d’entreprises par des pays étrangers suscitent des inquiétudes peut-être excessives mais aussi auxquelles il faut répondre – sans oublier que les IDE peuvent être un substitut efficace aux échanges commerciaux en permettant de produire au plus près des marchés.

Notre Commission appelle la Commission européenne à défendre vigoureusement les intérêts de ses membres dans les négociations internationales. Souhaitant apporter sa contribution à l’élaboration de politiques permettant à l’Europe de jouer pleinement son rôle dans la nouvelle économie mondialisée, Elle formule les recommandations suivantes :

1. On ne peut se résigner à l’abandon de facto de l’approche multilatérale au niveau mondial. Une initiative de relance de négociations commerciales dans le cadre multilatéral de l’OMC devrait être lancée par le G20, sur des bases modifiées (et éventuellement moins étendues, par exemple selon l’approche d’accords sectoriels plurilatéraux, par exemple dans le domaine de l’énergie et/ou de l’environnement) tenant compte des causes d’échecs du “Doha Round“. Cette initiative devrait, à notre sens, proposer un mode de négociation et de décision ne reposant plus exclusivement sur l’unanimité (le “consensus”) mais sur des règles de majorité qualifiée ou à tout le moins de « consensus minus »[4], assurant la représentation des pays en développement comme des pays développés.
2. Concernant le TTIP, quatre points nous paraissent essentiels pour que l’accord recherché constitue un progrès – comme semble l’être le CETA, accord régional conclu en 2013 avec le Canada – et soit accepté par l’opinion.

1. Une procédure de négociation plus transparente – malgré les efforts déjà fait en ce sens par la Commission européenne – permettant aux opinions publiques comme aux acteurs économiques de mieux comprendre les enjeux et d’être informés en temps réel de l’évolution ;
2. Des concessions réciproques équilibrées, ce qui semble loin d’être le cas actuellement, notamment sur la question de l’ouverture des marchés publics aux Etats-Unis et sur celle des normes techniques ; il faudra aussi développer des disciplines qui permettent de faciliter la réalisation des buts de la politique climatique, dont la traçabilité et la valorisation des émissions de carbone ;
3. Des procédures de résolution des conflits permettant à un tribunal arbitral public, statuant en droit international, de trancher les différends entre investisseurs et Etats ;
4. La préservation des régulations européennes et nationales protectrices en matière sanitaire et environnementale – notamment la possibilité de contingenter les émissions CO2 d’origine fossile -. Un “alignement par le bas” de ces régulations ne serait en effet tout simplement pas admis par les citoyens de nos pays. En revanche, tous devraient rechercher une convergence des normes vers le haut en vue d’une multilatéralisation de ces principes d’intérêt commun.

Par ailleurs, il serait souhaitable qu’en cas d’accord, celui –ci soit ouvert aux pays tiers.

3. Il n’est pas possible en l’état actuel des choses d’accorder purement et simplement à la Chine, dès fin 2016, un statut d’économie de marché qui ne correspond pas à la réalité ; en particulier, une forte restriction de la liberté d’information paraît incompatible avec le statut d’économie de marché. Une négociation approfondie doit être engagée avec les autorités de ce pays pour limiter strictement les pratiques de dumping dans les secteurs clés, comme la sidérurgie et le ciment, et pour s’assurer qu’elles relèvent progressivement leurs normes en matière sociale (notamment le travail des enfants et des prisonniers) et environnementale – même s’il faut reconnaitre que la Chine a fait de réels efforts sur ce dernier point depuis quelque temps. En tout état de cause, l’arsenal anti-dumping de l’Union européenne doit être renforcé en modernisant les instruments de défense commerciale, en utilisant des méthodes de calcul plus efficaces[5] en raccourcissant les procédures et en élargissant les modalités de dépôts de plainte.
4. La lutte contre les distorsions de concurrence engendrées par les inégalités sociales doit être une préoccupation centrale, non seulement dans chaque pays mais au niveau mondial. Les conventions de l’OIT et ses recommandations sur le “travail décent” doivent être prises en compte dès l’origine, tant dans les négociations ouvertes à l’OMC que dans les projets d’accords régionaux. En outre, l’introduction progressive, non seulement en Chine mais dans l’ensemble des pays en développement – en tenant compte de la situation des PMA – de minima sociaux en matière de salaire, de protection sociale et de conditions de travail doit être obtenue.
5. Les programmes européens d’éducation, de formation et d’encouragement à la mobilité devraient être renforcés pour encourager la reconversion des secteurs frappés par la mondialisation; il importe notamment de  majorer fortement l’ampleur des programmes de formation professionnelle et continue, au besoin sous forme décentralisée ou individuelle.
6. Il est nécessaire de poursuivre et de mener à bien la lutte contre les paradis fiscaux et plus largement contre l’évasion fiscale, l’érosion de bases et le transfert des profits (programme BEPS de l’OCDE). Les progrès déjà accomplis avec la généralisation (mais à partir de 2018 seulement pour certains pays) de l’échange automatique d’informations fiscales laissent place à trop d’exceptions (“loopholes”). Notamment, il faut encore améliorer la transparence du régime des fondations (Trusts) et imposer aux pays qui jouent encore les “passagers clandestins” (“free riders”) de suivre la règle commune.
7. En matière d’investissements directs étrangers, quatre priorités s’imposent :

• Définir au niveau de l’Union Européenne. une liste de secteurs stratégiques faisant exception au principe de la liberté d’investissement, plus ambitieuse que celle de l’OCDE[6] ;
• Développer le réseau d’accords bilatéraux de garanties des investissements, qui permet d’encourager ceux-ci en sécurisant les investisseurs ; ce réseau d’accords bilatéraux devrait être le plus possible conforme à une convention type établie sous l’égide des institutions de Bretton Woods (FMI et Banque Mondiale) ;

• Proposer un accord international par lequel les pays s’engageraient en cas de conflits concernant un IDE à en soumettre le règlement à un tribunal d’arbitrage public constitué sur le modèle de celui qui figure dans le CETA (Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement) entre l’UE et le Canada..
• Renforcer substantiellement le système du MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) en mettant en place un organisme international du type des banques de développement, spécialement chargé de couvrir une partie des risques des investisseurs lorsque ceux-ci s’implantent dans un pays en développement, afin d’encourager les transferts d’IDE du Nord vers le Sud.