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Work conducted within the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on sanctions to be implemented to ensure enforcement of EU’s values in case of their infringements by EU members

By Supporting Providing Fundamental Rights

 

Monika Flašíková Beňová

Scoreboard on Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental rights

There are several instruments we can refer to when a EU Member State is not in line with EU laws, but what happens when a Member State, acting outside the scope of EU law, does not respect fundamental rights? Art 7 TEU is the only Treaty-based instrument which could be used by EU institutions to sanction Member States in case of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU values regardless of whether they are implementing EU law or not.

Art. 7, as the only comprehensive tool (including prevention and penalty mechanisms), is widely considered a „nuclear option’, so very difficult to trigger due to its political essence, which comes from powers given on political institutions. Council never activates it because countries seem too scared that this procedure might also be applied against them.

This tool has never been used, because of the high procedural thresholds, among which the requirement for a 4/5th majority in Council to determine that there is a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ and the requirement for the European Council to decide by unanimity whether there is ‘a serious and persistent breach’ of the EU values. In both cases Parliament’s consent is required, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing an absolute majority of all Members (Art. 354(4) TFEU). To lower these high thresholds a Treaty amendment is required.

When Art. 7 was conceived, there was a wide consensus on the defence of fundamental rights, which is not the case now and the aim was to address only systemic and gross violations of these rights – not any violation. The main problem is that deciding whether a breach is serious and persistent or not is under the current setting a political decision. Another concern is that art 7 gives the Court of Justice of the EU a limited role, because it may only review compliance with procedural rules but not the merits of Art. 7 decisions, according to art 269 TFEU.

The author’s proposal for a Scoreboard on Democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights (hereinafter ‘Democracy Scoreboard’) aims at filling in the gap of “concrete actions” for the respect of fundamental rights and values in the EU. It does not mean to create a new mechanism but to complement it and create comprehensive framework for protection.

The main objectives are to:

a) Solve remaining challenges related to fundamental rights in Europe and art. 7 TEU in particular;

b) Overcome the issue of “double standards” (EU Member States expect other States to comply with EU values, but they don‟t want to be judged on their domestic affairs);

c) Propose a tool with monitoring features (to check the compliance of Member States with EU common values and respect for fundamental rights not only when implementing EU law, but also when they act autonomously) but also preventive and corrective ones.

d) Raise awareness and promote the Charter, by making EU citizens able to use it and defend their rights, linking them with the defence of democracy and the rule of law (e.g. case of media freedom);

What is the Democracy Scoreboard?

The Democracy Scoreboard should be an information, and also an evaluation, monitoring and alerting tool, providing an overview of the compliance of Member States with art 2 TEU on the Union‟s Values (1) and EU Charter .

Like the Justice Scoreboard, this tool should contribute to identifying potential shortcomings, improvements and good practices with regard to democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights through annual country assessments. It should be drawn up by the permanent Committee of independent experts (see below) in cooperation with Commission, Council and the Parliament (and the Fundamental Rights Agency).

In addition to the country assessment, which should be made available to the public on the Internet in a dedicated website along background documents, an early warning system should be set up with the main aim to alert the EU institutions in case a risk of a breach of EU common values is detected in a Member State.

Most importantly the Democracy Scoreboard should also monitor EU performance in respecting the rule of law and fundamental rights.

The scoreboard on Democracy will complement the scoreboard on Justice, and data provided by both of them should contribute to the European Semester process.

Content

The Democracy Scoreboard should:

1) Develop specific EU fundamental rights indicators to be incorporated in a Rights-based indicator framework. In the process of developing such indicators actors such as FRA (who is already developing indicators on the basis, inter alia, of the conceptual framework proposed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights and specific monitoring organs and mechanisms such as: the Group of States against corruption (GRECO), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)).

These indicators, which will be filled in with comparative, quantitative and qualitative data, will help assessing legislation and policies and their concrete effects on the lives of ordinary people, but also highlighting concerns that need to be further examined.

The Council of Europe is already carrying out monitoring of the compliance by Member States with their international obligations in fields such as protection of fundamental rights (freedom of expression, assembly and association), non-discrimination or the rule of law (democratic institutions, constitutional justice and ordinary justice, elections etc.). Monitoring is also performed by the European Commission via instruments such as the EU Justice Scoreboard and the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification for Bulgaria and Romania. The Democracy Scoreboard should not overlap with the existing instruments but should draw elements (data, indicators) from them, where relevant.

2) Include an Early warning system with different stages of alerts

Currently we see clear limitations in the effectiveness of the existing reporting mechanisms on fundamental rights, because the reports in most cases are released only after a breach of EU values has already occurred.

We therefore need an alert system that is sensitive also to the risk of a breach; in order to prevent it from becoming a serious breach of EU values, and such an alert should be automatically triggered. If an alert is triggered, Member States must suspend the adoption of

laws (2) or other measures that might disregard or breach fundamental rights.

3) Complement the EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law

The democracy scoreboard would be filling an important gap, because the existing European Commission framework to strengthen the rule of law cannot be triggered by individual breaches of fundamental rights and it only applies to the Rule of Law. We believe that dialogue with Member States, as soon as a risk of breach of fundamental rights is identified, is fundamental. The author agrees that the European Commission, as guardian of Treaties, must remain impartial, objective and an independent arbiter. That is why an external and independent body is needed.

Methodology

The Democracy Scoreboard will not be a new mechanism, but a tool, used by an independent monitoring body (see below)bringing together existing instruments (from FRA, Council of Europe and its Venice Commission, European Commission, European Parliament the Council of Europe, FRA, and relevant NGOs), promoting synergy and avoiding overlaps.

The Scoreboard will rely on the cooperation among EU institutions and agencies; Member States and relevant institutions at national level, including judicial authorities, human rights institutions, equality bodies, ombudsmen and civil society; and relevant international institutions.

Input from the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of European Union would also be valuable, especially on objective criteria to define both the clear risk of a serious breach and a serious and persistent breach of EU values. This requires better coordination, enhanced cooperation and making full use of both existing legislative and non-legislative tools in the relevant areas.

Who should be in charge of this tool?

We propose the creation of an independent monitoring body, composed of representatives of Commission, Parliament, Council, FRA, and Council of Europe, and possibly NGOs, which should act as a “one-stop-shop”. This body, to be set up without Treaty revision, will gather all existing information and tools in a unique EU report. ).

The FRA should be the agency leading this process, under the supervision of the European Commission as guardian of the treaties. Therefore FRA’s mandate should be extended to increase its monitoring powers vis-à-vis the EU member states, and provide it with the necessary human and financial resources.

Due to the fact that the Fundamental Rights Agency currently monitors only those areas falling within the EU‟s competence and it analyses trends and needs across the EU without singling out individual Member States, a permanent Committee of Independent experts (3), non-partisan and evidence based, should be set up through an inter-institutional agreement. It could start working immediately and all the recommendations of this body should become binding for the EU Commission. The Committee of Experts should work as a preventive tool, acting before a country has breached a value and as a monitoring tool, to evaluate the seriousness of the breach, to envisage the dialogue with the Member State concerned in line with the process of the EU Rule of law Framework.

Include the Scoreboard in the context of the European Semester process

Last year the Italian Presidency of the EU Council concluded that “the safeguard of the rule of law in the framework of the EU treaties” should be put on the agenda of the Council once a year.

As it is the case for the Scoreboard on Justice, data provided by the scoreboard on Democracy should contribute to the European Semester process in order to ensure the exchange of information at an inter-institutional level. This information could form the basis for the adoption of Country Specific Recommendations on the compliance with art.2 TEU by the EC, which then passes these to the Council of Ministers for eventual endorsement by the European Council. Member States should then incorporate this policy guidance into their annual budgets and other legislation.

We also believe that the European Parliament‟s role in the whole process should be increased.

Different levels of sanctions

Depending on the level of seriousness of the breach and the degree of cooperation of the Member State(s) in question different level of preventive measures/sanctions could be envisaged. Possible ideas include proposals of freezing EU funds or asking the Member State in question to freeze the national legislation/ acts/ decisions which might represent a risk of a breach of EU values. The possibilities for CJEU Court of Justice  to impose a fine or a lump sum on the Member State concerned could be explored as well.

Conclusion

To conclude, we need a comprehensive framework by bringing together all procedures available. Perhaps the possibility of Member States bringing action before the European Court of Justice against other Member states under art. 259 TFEU may be explored as a possibility to ensure enforcement of EU’s values, but preference should go to a strong role for the European Commission as the guardian of the EU Treaties who can launch infringement procedures as per art 258 TFEU with the final say remaining with for the Court of Justice of the EU.

(1) “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of DT\ law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”

(2) The duration and consequences of suspending the adoption of law will be discussed at a later stage.

(3) The structure and peculiarity of this Committee and the appointment of its members will be discussed at a later stage

DT\1083793EN.doc                                                                                                         PE575.273v01-00

04/25/2020
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Face to Face with Illusions and Realities

By EU Enlargement Policy

Having promised this blog to TPQ we did agree that we could post it on our website under the condition that we cited them. The original article can also be found at:

http://turkishpolicy.com/blog/11/face-to-face-with-illusions-and-realities#.Vryw-uKB5NM.mailto

On the occasion of the International Peace Congress organized in Paris in 1849, in his speech entitled “A Day Will Come,” Victor Hugo had spoken of a period when Europe would be known as the “United States of Europe” and where in his words:

“You France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, you all, nations of the continent, without losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individuality, will be merged closely within a superior unit and you will form the European brotherhood”.

A European Union exists to-day but without Russia.

John Maynard Keynes in 1930 in his Essays in Persuasions wrote an article called “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” where he tried to answer the following question: “What can we reasonably expect the level of our economic life to be a hundred years hence? What are the economic possibilities for our grandchildren?” His answer was as follows:

“The pace at which we can reach our destination of economic bliss will be governed by four things; our power to control population, our determination to avoid wars and civil dissensions, our willingness to entrust to science the direction of those matters which are properly the concern of science, and the rate of accumulation as fixed by the margin between our production and our consumption; of which the last will easily look after itself, given the first three.”

Today, we are far from being able to make similar projections for our world or the EU. We can no longer speak of a unifying Europe at a time when we speak of a Brexit and Grexit, or of an EU with no problems when it is still living the economic side effects of the 2008 crisis which started hitting them hard in 2009. The recovery is still slow and the Eurozone still prone to ups and downs. To the existing economic crisis, new social and political problems have been added. The influx of refugees from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, the specter of the rise of extreme right parties and fascism within the EU forces us to contemplate a somewhat dark future for Europe.

Things do not look too bright for Turkey either. The economy is slowing down, many cities and regions of Turkey are living the aftershocks of having close to three million Syrian refugees living in the country, looking for jobs, living quarters, and schools while the widening conflict in Turkey’s southeast between government forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues causing domestic and regional uncertainties.

These multifarious problems have led Turkey and the EU to revitalize their up till now frozen relations. The EU that had always emphasized its concerns on human rights, civil liberties, and democracy in Turkey seems now to have replaced the priority it had given to these fundamental values with new concerns about regional security, rising terrorism in the West, and the increase in the flow of refugees. This duplicity in the way relations between Turkey and the EU is conducted is saddening but a reality

The Turkey-EU Summit meeting of November 29, 2015 and the meetings that followed the summit allowed for the opening of a new Chapter  ­– Chapter 17 – in the accession negotiations, the starting of discussions over visa free travel for Turkish citizens by the end of the current year, the upgrading of the Customs Union Agreement, and the initiation of multiple talks on energy cooperation. This revitalization of relations was coolly welcomed by pro-EU constituencies in Turkey. One has only become too used to the “one step forward two steps back” policies of both the EU and Turkey.

Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy which was opened to negotiation during the Intergovernmental Conference last December had been formerly blocked by France’s former President Nicolas Sarkozy. It is the 15th chapter to have been opened out of a total of 35. In my opinion, Turkey will face no trouble in aligning itself to the directives of Chapter 17. Its level of alignment to the Maastricht Criteria is somewhat satisfactory especially with regard to the levels of budgetary deficit and public debt. But inflation, total independence of the central bank and aligning Turkey’s laws with the EU’s Economic and Monetary Policy legislation are areas in which further progress is needed.

The visa issue is a complex one. It is stated that by October 2016, Turkish citizens will be able to travel to the EU without a visa. However, 72 criteria have to be met by Turkey during this visa liberalization roadmap, including the recognition of Cyprus which currently Turkey does not recognize. This political issue will have to be resolved before visa exemption for Turkish citizens can become a reality. Visa-free travel is also contingent on Turkey implementing the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which would result in third country citizens illegally entering Europe via Turkey forced to return  to Turkey. The agreement is an ambiguous one since all illegal entrants from Turkey, independent of the time they might have moved to an EU country, could be sent back. There seems to be no time limit and one expert jokingly pointed out that even those illegal immigrants who had entered Europe in the 1940’s could end up being sent back.

Upgrading the Customs Union agreement (CU)[1] by modernizing its functioning and extending it to new areas and Turkey’s inclusion in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)[2] are two important topics on Turkey’s agenda. It has been argued for quite sometime that the present CU agreement was in need of revision. When examining the many possibilities concerning what kind of changes might be involved, five potential scenarios come to light:

1. Not changing the agreement thus letting the current and worsening implementation deficit and non-compliance record stand

2. Modernizing the agreement by making amendments without changing its sectorial scope, that is letting it deal only with industrial products

3. Taking the agreement as a base and revising it with a view to facilitating its functioning and expanding it to cover new areas

4. Working out a totally new CU agreement

5. Replacing the CU with a Free Trade Agreement

My preference would be Scenario 3 since it would necessitate less time to agree on revisions than rewriting a totally new CU agreement.

Since Turkey is not a member of the EU, Turkey’s inclusion in the TTIP faces serious obstacles. There is a slight chance that when a final agreement on TTIP is reached, Turkey might be integrated into the agreement since it is already a candidate country that has already signed a Customs Union Agreement with the EU. If this does not happen, then the solution might reside in Turkey’s signing a separate Free Trade Agreement with the US. Right now the EU-US trade talks are still continuing and a final agreement does not appear to be within reach. The 12th round of talks will take place in Brussels from February 22 to February 26 2016. We should be ready for a succession of rounds in the future.

Coming back to where we stand today in Turkey’s relations with the EU, the main item on the agenda for the EU seems to be to secure its borders with the help of Turkey in return for which it will extend financial aid to Turkey for hosting refugees while leaving the door slightly open for future accession. Wondering  whether we shall ever squeeze in…

[1] http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_trade_035_turkey_en.pdf

[2] Kemal Kirişci “Turkey and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Boosting the Model Partnership with the United States” The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings, Policy paper Number 2, September 2013

 

04/25/2020
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The Federation of EU Associations in Turkey had been founded on May 9, 2014

By Participatory Democracy and Civil Society Dialogue

Turkey had applied to join the EU in 1987 and became eligible in 1997. In October 2004  it was declared that accession  negotiations  would be started  and that parallel to accession negotiations the EU would engage in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. To enhance mutual understanding the EU emphasized that this inclusive dialogue would also involve civil society.

To support the strengthening of the role of civil society the Federation of EU Associations was founded in May 2014.

The primary goals of the Federation may be summarized as :

To pursue policy based research focusing on the economic, political, cultural, social, sectorial and regional issues related to Turkey’s candidacy to the EU.

To promote policy dialogue between civil society, NGOs’, Turkey, the EU, and its member states.

The members of the Federation are

-Avrupa Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi Derneği, Ankara (EU Workcentre Association)

-İstanbul Avrupa Birliği Öncüleri Derneği ( Istanbul EU Pioneers’ Association)

-Konya Avrupa Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi Derneği (EU Workcentre Association of Konya)

-İstanbul Beyoğlu Avrupa Birliği Derneği ( The Istanbul Beyoğlu EU Association)

-Çukurova Avrupa Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi Derneği’dir. (The EU Workcentre Association of Çukurova)

04/25/2020
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Turkey as a European and regional hub: Implications for Euro-Mediterranean relations

By Connecting to the EU Decision Making Process

                 XIIth CONFERENCE of the MEDITERRANNEAN COMMISSION

                                   Turkey as a European and regional hub

                                    Implications for Euro-Mediterranean relations

Istanbul, 5-6 February 2016

                                               Summary of the meeting

« Is Turkey a European and regional hub?” this was the topic of an international conference that was organised in Istanbul on February 5th and 6th 2016. The meeting analysed Turkey’s strategic position as a bridge between Europe and other neighbouring regions and its implications for Euro-Mediterranean relations in four different sectors: energy, finances, infrastructures and production. The conference concluded that Turkey already is an enviable transit hub, but that the bar should be put higher to make it into a real trading hub. The speed of the EU accession process will of course play a determining role.

The international meeting was attended by some 80 participants from the EU and Turkey. The conference was co-organised by IKV (Economic Development Foundation, Istanbul), CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) and the Mediterranean Commission of ELEC (European League for Economic Cooperation, Brussels).

In his welcome remarks Carles Gasòliba, president of CIDOB and of the Mediterranean Commission of ELEC, pointed out that the previous meetings of the Mediterranean Commission which started in 1996, focused primarily on the western part of the Mediterranean. By addressing in this 12th conference the eastern part of the Mediterranean, the key role of Turkey in Mediterranean affairs is acknowledged. Since the aim of ELEC is to support a greater and deeper European Union, it also wants to improve the relations with Turkey. Gasòliba thanked the co-organisers of the conference, as well as the co-sponsor, the Obra Social of the La Caixa Foundation.

President Ayhan Zeytinoglu of IKV explained that his organisation, that celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2015, is specialised in EU and Turkey-EU matters. Turkey realised an annual economic growth rate of 4.7% in the period 2002-2014, thanks to the tentative EU membership perspective that was an anchor for reforms. Turkey is now the 18th economy in the world and member of the G-20, and has made considerable progress in tackling its macro-economic imbalances. Hopefully the refugee crisis will speed up the accession proceedings with the EU.

Hansjörg Haber, the head of the European Union delegation in Turkey, pointed out that Turkey and Istanbul have always been a hub in a wide variety of fields, ranging from culture to the topics that are discussed at this conference: energy, finance, infrastructure and production. In energy, Turkey has an enviable position since it is a bridge between the consumer countries in the west and the oil and gas producing countries in the east, although it lacks physical connections and an integrated market. In finance Istanbul has an outstanding potential. Much will depend on the stability of the legal and fiscal environment. Infrastructure has been considerably upgraded, also thanks to substantial grants by the EU, but much remains to be done in education and training. Finally, Turkey is also a favourable hub for production, in sectors such as automotive, pharma and services.

Rauf Engin Soysal, Turkish undersecretary for EU affairs, reminded that we live in critical times, facing immense challenges. Turkish-EU closeness matters more than ever, as was demonstrated during the November 2015 summit between Turkey and the EU. We are all Mediterraneans. It is time to act in favour of full EU accessibility. On the question whether Turkey is a European and regional hub, Soysal claimed that Turkey is already in the very heart of Europe. But the bar should be set higher. Turkey has already a privileged position in the EU and NATO and the same should be pursued in the whole surrounding region. The immigration crisis is now the top priority and the EU and Turkey have to respond together. Turkey has proved it is up to the challenge. With its economic growth of more than 4%, Turkey is already number four on the world raking. Every day the country raises the bar on fundamental rights and freedoms. It wants to capture the momentum of European and global values. Turkey is not a country of barbarism and terrorism, but a big laboratory in combining traditionalism with modernism. If Europe puts the focus on the Mediterranean, it would in fact return to its own foundations.

Energy hub

The first session of the conference on Turkey as a European and regional hub was devoted to the energy sector. Sohbet Karbuz from the Obserservatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie in Paris that gathers energy companies that operate in the Mediterranean, first wondered what “a hub” means. The term refers to a corridor, a transit, but a good hub should also be a trading platform. In gas, Turkey still has a long way to go, but the potential is there. Karbuz referred to the Turkish Stream plans and the many challenges in the gas market (Russia, storage, legal framework). A domestic production would be a plus. One should also keep in mind that global gas markets are changing (LNG, shale oil, prices). At the same time, Turkey should make efforts to act as an oil hub. The name “hub” or “transit” is not important, what is needed is a 20 or 30 year strategic plan.

Ridvan Ucar, general manager of Aygas Natural Gas Wholesale Trade, agreed with the analysis of the former speaker. One should look at the map and see where the best location for a hub is. Turkey is situated in-between consumers and producers, but it is more than only a pipe line. Making a transit hub into a trading hub demands efforts. Turkey should not miss the boat to become a trading hub and should not be afraid to make mistakes while doing so. This requires liberalisation, which is a long term process. For the EU, Turkey can offer supply security.

Olgu Okumus, project manager of the energy division of the Union for the Mediterranean, said her organisation tries to enhance cooperation with the Mediterranean through concrete projects. By way of energy platforms, it provides a permanent forum, e.g. gas, regional electricity markets and renewable energy. In electricity transmission, Turkey links the eastern part of the Mediterranean.

Financial hub

During the second session, Turkey’s role as a financial hub was discussed. According to Fabian Briegel, economist at Rabobank (Netherlands), Turkey’s potential as a financial centre is considerable but it will take time to achieve this goal. Among the many favourable factors, the fact that Turkey is an EU accession candidate is of upmost importance. In international rankings Istanbul is not so far behind Paris or Amsterdam. The Turkish capital market is dominated by banks, while financing through stocks and bonds plays a minor role. One of the weaknesses is the dependence on foreign funding because Turkey struggles with its current account deficit, which in turn results in exchange rate volatility and high inflation. This contrasts with countries such as the UAE and Saudi-Arabia that can rely on local financial savings. So macro-economic reforms should be continued, while micro-economic policy should enhance public stock listings, corporate governance and information to foreign investors.

Rankings may act as an incentive for politicians, but according to Alvaro Oritz, economist at BBVA Bank (Spain), the problem is that there are no safe havens in emerging markets. Turkey has a Chinese growth rate of 4% but is surrounded by countries such as the Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Greece. Among the positive factors, he mentioned the reduction of the current account deficit from 10% to 4%, the absence of an ageing population, the potential for corporate profit growth, the excellent infrastructure and a good image. The accession process to the EU is – just like it was in Spain – a positive thing because it makes reforms necessary, be it that the political crisis in the EU makes it more difficult than before. Turkey should make efforts to improve its comparative advantages, but Oritz recommended to select priorities rather than aiming for all components of the ranking. Turkey should not forget either that Hong Kong and Singapore were trading centres before they developed into a financial centre.

Yavuz Canevi, chairman of the Turkish Economy Bank and former governor of the Turkish Central Bank, referred to the action plans that were launched to make Istanbul an international financial centre. They are now for 80% completed, but challenges remain ahead. The most important is that after a sleeping period Turkey is now re-emerging as a candidate EU country. This horizon should be finally cleared. Other challenges are the normalisation and democratisation process, private lead growth and reducing inflation. It is also essential that the new administration structure that needs to be set up for the international financial centre of Istanbul, should not be run by the government. At the same time, Istanbul should look for specific financial niches such as Islamic finance or a regional centre for multinationals’ administration. After the banking crisis, Istanbul already improved its relative performance. There is a window of opportunity. By 2050 the Turkish economy will be the 9th economy in the world (versus 16th now) and the third in Europe (versus 6th now). The contribution to GDP of a financial centre could be as high as 8%.

The debate after the financial hub session treated topics such as Turkish migration to the EU, Syrian refugees in Turkey, challenges of turning developing countries into developed countries and access to Far East savings and investments.

Infrastructure hub

The third session analysed Turkey as an infrastructure, communications and logistics hub. Yigit Alpogan, deputy secretary general of the Union for the Mediterranean, explained that his organisation brings together the 28 EU member states and 15 countries from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. It was launched in 2008 by then French president Sarkozy as an alternative to Turkey’s admission to the EU. The UfM strictly focuses on projects, and does not interfere with the peace process in the region. Syria’s membership, for example, is suspended until peace comes back to the country. But through political engineered solutions, the UfM brokers delicate projects such as the desalinisation project in Gaza, the trans-Maghreb highway, and projects between Morocco and Algeria. In infrastructure, the UfM would like to expand the trans-Maghreb highway around the whole Mediterranean Sea. It promotes linking the north and south of the Mediterranean by the “Motorway of the Sea” initiative.

Evren Bingöl of the International Transporters’ Association indicated that the improved quality of Turkish infrastructure made Turkey climb in the logistic sector index of the World Bank from the 39th place in 2007 to the 30th place in 2014, on a total of 160 countries, and this despite a setback in timeliness and price competitiveness. She focussed specifically on road transit, which handicaps greatly the customs union between Turkey and the EU. A Turkish truck that transports goods to, for example, Germany, is submitted to successive quota when it wants to drive through countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. Permits are needed to cross each country and are only supplied in restricted quantities. Italy for its part distributes a limited quantity of permits every two months, resulting in a cyclic slowdown of trade. All this involves a huge cost – estimated at 3.4 billion

euro – aggravated by a very complex system of limited visas for truck drivers. The restrictions are only applied to transport coming from Turkey. This is even more absurd since half of Turkey-EU exports originates from Turkish affiliates of EU capital companies. Mrs. Bingöl fiercely pleaded to at least liberalise transit transport. A first step could be that the 28 EU member states provide global and not country by country quotas. Overall, Turkeys strategic objective is to become not only a transport hub but a regional logistic hub, that reaches out not only to the EU but that goes as far as China and the Caspian Sea.

An animated discussion followed not only on road transit restrictions, but also on connections to the Black Sea, the possible role of river transport on the Danube, the position of Cyprus and the Syrian refugee problem.

Production hub

The fourth and final session was devoted to Turkey as a production and service hub. Antonio Martins da Cruz, president of ELEC Portugal and former Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, emphasised that political will or a good strategic position are not enough to become a hub. A market is needed. Turkey is set to become a regional power. It has many strategic assets but can also be a strategical threat in regional disputes. Until recently, Turkey had no problems with its neighbours, but the Arab spring changed all that. It is difficult to act as a safe corridor amid regional and political tensions. Several obstacles undermine Turkish ambitions. Syria, Iraq and Isis, but also Kurdish separatism, could create uncertainty that can spill over to investments and tourism. The re-emergence of Iran, the Russian intervention in Syria and the Chinese plans to build a new silk road also pose challenges. Africa on the contrary is an opportunity that could make Turkey a hub for this region. For the EU, cooperation with Turkey is essential to ease the refugee burden, even if the EU is divided on this topic. At the same time, the EU integration process has changed. The EU could be growing into a multispeed club with different circles (euro, Schengen, defence, integration) around a common platform and with more power for national governments. Martins da Cruz, finally, warned that if Turkey joins the EU, it will still be a peripheral country in the EU, which does not make things easier.

According to Bozkurt Aran, director of the TEPAV Centre for Multilateral Trade Studies, nowadays it is globalisation that determines the rapid economic growth of Turkey. Liberalisation, the customs union with the EU, the growing role of SME’s, the development of the financial system and an export lead growth, all have favoured investments. Turkey is now the largest industrial production hub between Italy and China. It is not yet a trading nation, but it plays a leading role in the region. The EU and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) account for 70% of Turkish trade. Given their specific geographical connections, the western part of Turkey is more directed towards the EU, the eastern part towards MENA. Two projects will be of major influence in the future: the new silk road that China wants to build and the TTIP trade agreements that will allow Turkey to deepen its custom union.

Haluk Nuray, the IKV representative at the EU in Brussels, fears that the EU customs union, that was the most important factor in the sevenfold increase of Turkish exports towards the EU since the eighties, is now halted. To get things moving again, more is needed than liberalisation. Turkey should produce unique products, at a good price and with facilitated transport. In equipment and skills, Turkey should raise the bar higher than just middleclass. To convince other partners, Turkey needs more innovation to attract technology transfers. Turkey is already part of the European production chain, but should also become part of the global value chain. Being involved in the EU and TTIP are solid references for Turkey. Since accessibility to the EU is key, achieving stability and respecting the fundamental freedoms are a necessity.

In the debate with the audience, the question whether the end of Iran’s isolation is an opportunity or a threat for Turkey was widely discussed, as well as the consequences of the migration and refugee flow.

In his concluding remarks, ELEC Mediterranean Commission president Carles Gasòliba said that Turkey is indeed a European and regional hub, but there remains still a lot of work to be done in the current difficult times. The recent EU-Turkish summit showed a will to improve relations and could be a turning point in the integration process. IKV chairman Ayhan Zeytinoglu thanked speakers and participants and confirmed that IKV does everything it can to realise the Turkish association to the EU.

 

04/25/2020
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CIVIL SOCIETY AND BEYOND

By Participatory Democracy and Civil Society Dialogue

Civil Society and Beyond: A Joint Dialogue on the European Path | Belgrade, Serbia | February 25-26, 2016

The two day International Conference “Civil Society and Beyond: A Joint Dialogue on the European Path” was organized on February 25-26, 2016 by the European Movement International and European Movement in Serbia, with the support of TACSO P2P and in partnership with the Serbian European Integration Office.

The purpose of the conference was to create an opportunity for stakeholders from different countries from the Western Balkans and Turkey  to exchange perspectives and experiences with regard to the role of civil society in the European integration, as well as to work on the mechanisms for strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation among CSOs in the WBT region and the EU.

The event gathered 155 participants from civil society from the EU, the Western Balkan and Turkey region and Serbia, as well as from European institutions and national authorities from the region, and attracted significant media attention.

See Report at : http://tacso.org/doc/civil%20society.pdf

04/25/2020
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Turabder’s Answers to EMint’s questions on Enlargement Policies in the Western Balkans and Turkey

By EU Enlargement Policy

Enlargement Consultations

Political Committee “Europe in the World”

In order to update EMI Policy Position on Enlargement, well in advance of the annual Progress Reports that will be presented by the European Commission in the autumn, European Movement int has sent us a questionnaire with a couple of stimulating questions regarding our enlargement-views. This process is also a follow-up to the EMI Belgrade Congress held in February 2016 and is connected to EMI’s work ahead of the Civil Society Forum in the framework of the Berlin process (intergovernmental process on topics not treated by the enlargement negotiations with the Balkan countries to the EU; Paris, July 2016). The questions asked and our answers were as follows:

  1. Please give your opinion and remarks on the current developments, progress as well as points of concern for the individual (potential) candidate countries you wish to comment upon:

Montenegro (negotiations ongoing): …should become a member as soon as possible without having to wait five years. ……………………………………………….

Serbia (negotiations ongoing): … should become a member as soon as possible without having to wait five years. ……………………………………………….……………………………………………….

Turkey (negotiations ongoing): …Ongoing negotiations should be more rapid. Chapters 23 and 24 should never have been blocked. I f they had been opened 10 years ago instead of those of an economic character we would be facing a different Turkey to-day……………………………………………….

Albania (negotiations yet to be opened): negotiations should be opened

FYR of Macedonia (negotiations yet to be opened): negotiations should be opened.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (potential candidate): should become a member as soon as possible without having to wait five years.

Kosovo (potential candidate): negotiations should be started

 2. What mechanisms should be applied or fostered to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation among CSOs in the WBT (Western Balkans and Turkey) cooperation? 1. The procedures of Civil Society Facility Programme of Western Balkans can be simplified as it is the case in Turkey. “Sivil Düşün” model can be applied in the region at large 2.The system has to force civil society organisations to come up with  new  ideas to generate fruitful cooperation and not only to organize standard trainings and workshops. 3. EU’s Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organizations (TACSO) has relatively worked well. And its working model can be duplicated in each targeted countries through local ownerships after the project ends 4. In addition to promote bilateral and multilateral promotion of CSOs in WB and Turkey, the mechanisms related to civil society-public sector should be enforced. 5. More flexible and less hierarchical structures should exist, especially among youth organizations. 6.New mechanisms should be developed to facilitate regional cooperation.

3. What are the difficulties civil society faces when it comes to providing real input for the negotiation process? The problem is common to almost all applicants and some member countries. 1. Learning about the decisions taken takes place only after these decisions have been made. 2. Representatives of civil society are not part of the decision making process. It is hard for CSOs to get heard by governments. They do not participate in any of the official meetings 3. Consultative meetings held by these representatives end up with conclusions listed in a short resume which is usually not taken into consideration by the decision makers 4. These organizations need to develop their knowledge about the details involved in the chapters discussed or to be discussed.

4. What are the dangers and problems you currently identify in the Western Balkans, which (could) negatively affect the enlargement process? 1.  The EU is presently engulfed in political, economic and social crises which have led to a larger distrust of EU members and applicants vis a vis EU institutions (the Parliament as well as the Commission). 2. Conflicts between neighbor countries as well domestic problems within these applicants slow down their progress in abiding to the EU values and to the acquis 3. Rise of right wing ultra nationalist parties, governments becoming more protection oriented, more totalitarian and conservative hampers regionalization and internationalization endangers enlargement.

5. What currently jeopardizes / can potentially jeopardize the enlargement process, both from the EU and WBT front? I.  External shocks could jeopardize this process. The world economy is not faring well and an external shock such as that could cause the EU members to face difficulties which would have its impact on applicant countries too. II. Internal shock:   A Brexit followed by other countries could lead to lower trust in the EU with the result that applicant countries and member countries would prefer to slow down even more the enlargement process.

6. How could (potential) candidate countries be included in a sustainable European solution to the migrant and refugee crisis? This is a problem which the EU will not be able to solve on its own. 1. On Foreign policy issues the EU is not capable of producing a union level response to which all members would subscribe. The EU cannot formulate constructive policies. 2. The rise of extreme right wing parties backed up by ultra nationalist civil society organizations will also hamper the possibility of finding such a sustainable solution. This is quite unfortunate but we think it reflects the reality. 3. But in spite of this, civil society organizations could and should play a role in helping migrants who have reached their countries by ensuring their safety and their rights. 4. Those applicant and member countries mostly affected by this crisis should be monitored and helped. 5. Migrant and refugee rights promoting NGOs should be supported to form linkages with one another.

7. Where should the EU stand in the enlargement narrative in face of the crises it is struggling with? Nothing is sure for the upcoming two years. No prospects of further enlargement can exist under these conditions. Yet this does not mean that nothing should be done. 1. The EU should go beyond acquis conditionality by being more proactive in dealing with the domestic problems in applicant countries. 2. Discontent about good governance which is also a problem in some member countries should be addressed. 3. The EU should also be more informative about what is expected when negotiating different chapters. Organize meetings with related CSOs and discuss with them what will be faced in their country, what has been faced in member countries so that there will not be any after shocks during their applications. 4. Pre-accession policies should be improved so that there will be no discrepancies between implementing EU rules which are uniform for all and what is in application in the various sectors of the applicants. This would help anticipate and solve the problems that might arise if there is any important mismatches. 5. Control of preaccesion funds is another issue. 6. Finally given that EU is the only plausible peace solution in the current state affairs, it should create a positive enlargement narrative right away and impose sanctions on countries which actually do hurt this positive narrative. The  rhetoric in countries such as Hungary and Serbia should especially be changed.

8. What impact do you think the next enlargement will have on:

The (potential) candidate countries: 1. it will force them to have better entente with one           another, be more democratic, more respectful of human rights& freedom of the press. 2. The EU is still the only regional organization that carries a promise for peace and stability. Its effect on candidate countries is normative. 

The current EU Member States 1. Since these members have small economies the impact of their economic integration on member countries will not be detrimental. They will be easily   absorbed. 2. But addressing the needs of the looser of            this economic integration will also             be an   important policy issue. The political disorders which may then ensue among members will be         more difficult to solve by the EU. 4. Backsliding in the application of fundamental      values if any will be difficult to control as it has already been see in some member countries. EU             member states should stop thinking short term and go back to the European       value system   where prevalence and strength of democracy goes unquestioned and is promoted. 

9. How could the momentum for the enlargement process be regained? (remarks are welcome both with regard to the EU and the WBT) How to make Europe a project worth fighting for? Difficult in these times but still possible. In the WBT: 1. The EU should work hand in hand with CSOs irrespective of their political allegiance and help them organize meetings with university students, high school students even primary school students. 2. Young people of applicant countries should get to meet young pro European young people from member countries.   In the EU 1. The  EU should be reminded that long-term thinking and policies are its  defining characteristics, characteristics which distinguishes it from other organizations. 2. Pro European CSOs should be more active. Should develop branches in all their regions. Should not work like CSOs for retired people and should enroll more young people.

10. In the Serbian Congress report, especially in the part on Word Café conclusions, you can see a wish list of Balkan CSOs. Is there anything else you would identify as the urgent needs of Civil Society Organisations in the context of the enlargement process? Get more interaction between CSOs , find the financial means to get them together, otherwise what as accomplished in World Cafe was great.

 

04/25/2020
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European Movement Int statements on Istanbul Airport Attack

By External Affairs

Petros Fassoulas Secretary General
29th June 2016 – 13:32 GMT

Following the deadly attacks at Istanbul’s Atatürk airport, the European Movement International shares its condolences with the family and friends of the 41 victims and 239 wounded.

The attack on Europe’s third-busiest airport is only the latest in a series of suicide bombings in Turkey. In the face of yet another tragic and senseless attack striking our continent, we are one. We share in one another’s grief.

We also send our thoughts to our colleagues at the European Movement Turkey, who work with many civil society partners throughout Turkey. Their work is essential at this time of rising xenophobia and extremist actions. In common with our colleagues, the European Movement International holds true to the values of freedom, tolerance and respect for human rights that are the hallmarks of an open and progressive society.

Jo Leinen  President  Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 4:07 PM

Dear Günver,

I followed with deep disgust the bomb attack on the international airport in Istanbul. The city is now once more the target of terrorists. In fact, the whole of European Movement International is in solidarity with the European Movement Turkey. The fight against terrorism unites us against all national borders.

Please communicate this message to all our friends in your lovely country.

Kind regards,

Jo Leinen

04/25/2020
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BREXIT FROM A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

By Brexit and Grexit

BREXIT FROM A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

Ilter TURAN

Istanbul Bilgi University

Member of TURABDER

The decision of the British people to leave the EU has produced three types of responses in Turkey. To not a negligible group who are busy in making the ends meet, whatever happens in the EU is their business and is, therefore, of littlerelevance to Turkey. To another group, heterogeneous in nature, including both those who are opposed to Turkey’s search of a future in Europe and those who are fed up with the arrogance with which many members and institutions of the EU have approached Turkey, Brexit shows that the EU is also running into trouble and that trouble may even be existential. This, therefore, is a positive development, an indication of where things may go in the future. A third group, on the other hand, is gravely concerned that an arrangement that has brought stability, peace and prosperity to the continent since after the Second World War is under challenge and this is likely to produce negative outcomes for Turkey.

I do belong to this third group that meets Brexit with anxiety for a variety of reasons. First, the EU constituted not only a framework for European cooperation but also for regulated political competition.  In this framework, Britain played the role of the balancer reminiscent of its role in the balance of power system that prevailed in Europe during the 19th Century. With Britain out, a France that seems to be declining may find German prevalence difficult to digest, a possibility that will place major stress on the Union. Secondly, the British departure may invite others to advocate a similar undertaking. Whileother departures may seem unlikely at the moment, each referendum is not only likely to paralyze the Union temporarily, but also weaken its determination to become a more coherent and integrated entity. Third, a weakened union would deliver less stability and prosperity than now, augmenting the credibility of the arguments of those that are opposed to either to the existence or of further development of the union. For example, a weaker union would be less likely to conclude a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and it would be less capable developing a security framework for the defense of Europe.

Rather than continue with the difficulties Brexit might pose for Europe, let me turn to how it would affect Turkey and its relations. To begin with, a weakened and less capable Europe is a security concern for Turkey, a country that is located in a troublesome region where European commitment as a security provider is always important. Second, the EU had served as an anchor for Turkey in organizing its own domestic politics along democratic lines while expanding the rule of law and the operation of the market economy. Its weakening is likely to affect negatively the nature of the Turkish political system that is already coming under the challenge of one-man rule. Third, Britain had been a strong supporter of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU will prove dysfunctional for her pursuit of full membership. In this light, it is hardly surprising that some circles have begun to advocate the termination of Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU.

What does the future hold? An optimist would say that if the British departure paves the ground for a two speed Europe, it might be easier for Turkey to find a place for her in the second tier. A pessimist would identify Brexit as the beginning of the end. If that happens, both all members of the EU and Turkey would end as losers in all domains from security to economics to democracy. That is on outcome that no one wants. Bağlantı

 

04/25/2020
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Women of Europe Awards

By Women Issues

Women of Europe Awards

The Women of Europe Awards is a new initiative by the European Movement International and the European Women’s Lobby, building upon the national awards of several National European Movement Councils. The awards will be handed out to honour women striving to advance the European project in their professional or private capacity. The role of women in the European project remains largely unrecognised, and the awards will highlight the contribution of women in promoting and advancing European issues, and to increase the presence and involvement of women in debates about Europe and its future.

For the first edition of the Award in December 2016, there are two prize categories:

  • Jury’s Award: Woman in Power
    For women showing extraordinary leadership on a European level
  • Members’ Award: Woman in Action
    For women undertaking extraordinary actions at grass-root level in Europe

A Jury composed of high-level stakeholders from the cultural, social, media and political sectors will decide on two shortlists based on the nominations received from members of the European Movement International and the European Women’s Lobby.

04/25/2020
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Communiqué du séminaire à Rome 27 & 28 octobre 2016

By Other

Communiqué du séminaire à Rome 27 & 28 octobre 2016 Il faut agir ensemble pour développer les régions rurales du Sud et du Nord Méditerranée La Fondation du Dialogue Sud-Nord Méditerranée, présidée par M. NOTHOMB, Ministre d’Etat de la Belgique, en partenariat avec la Bibliothèque d’Alexandrie, réunit depuis 2006 tous les trois ans, sur un pied de stricte égalité, des acteurs de la société civile et des acteurs publics des deux rives de la Méditerranée. Au congrès de Milan en Octobre 2015, les participants, avec le GFAR-Global Forum for Agricultural Research et YPARDYoung Professionals for Agricultural Development, deux réseaux appuyés par la FAO, ont discuté du développement des régions rurales du Sud et du Nord, une priorité absolue pour éviter que les déséquilibres entre Sud et Nord ne s’aggravent et amplifient davantage les flux migratoires. En 2015, il avait été convenu de se rencontrer en 2016 pour faire le point des évolutions, notamment depuis la nouvelle politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne. Les 27 et 28 octobre 2016 les participants se sont, comme convenu, réunis à Rome pour discuter de l’évolution et préparer le prochain congrès de la Fondation en 2018. Les discussions ont souligné l’importance de la vie associative et de la capacité et l’autonomie des autorités régionales et locales, éminemment nécessaires pour dénouer les problèmes de développement dans les zones rurales. Une bonne coordination entre les stratégies « bottom up » et « top down » est indispensable pour assurer une évolution positive. Des perspectives doivent être offertes aux jeunes et à la situation des femmes dans les zones rurales. Certaines initiatives des acteurs du Nord, tel que l’ agritourisme, la culture hydroponique, commencent à être reproduites dans le Sud. Un bon accompagnement est indispensable. D’autres programmes prometteurs sont aussi mis en place dans plusieurs pays du Sud. La formation professionnelle, l’accompagnement sur le terrain par la société civile et un véritable partenariat entre pouvoirs publics et société civile sont indispensables pour offrir un avenir pour les zones rurales et par cela contribuer à infléchir les flux migratoires. Les défis sont énormes (changement climatique, pénuries d’eau, croissance démographique,…). Il faut donc créer des opportunités pour les jeunes souvent découragés. Les réseaux sociaux devraient aussi contribuer à rendre l’environnement rural plus attrayant. Les participants se sont largement accordés sur la nécessité impérative d’intensifier la coopération entre les deux rives. Des efforts sont faits, certains progrès sont déjà visibles mais encore insuffisants au regard des multiples défis. Ils appellent pour cela d’une part à une intensification du dialogue positif entre tous les acteurs des deux rives et d’autre part à un effort financier accru, en particulier dans le cadre de la politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne. Ils estiment qu’un accroissement significatif des investissements dans les régions rurales du Sud et du Nord de la Méditerranée, y compris dans l’éducation et la formation, aurait un impact positif sur l’emploi des jeunes et le statut des femmes. Les participants appellent l’Union pour la Méditerranée à un dialogue continu avec la Fondation. Seule une bonne coordination entre les différents acteurs et un appui financier soutenu de l’Union européenne et des Etats du Nord et du Sud et une coopération entre régions pourront contribuer à améliorer la situation économique et sociale dans les régions rurales du Sud méditerranéen.

04/25/2020
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